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lier draft. So did more than three score other scholars to whom I 
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result. 
I. Introduction 
The Mecca of the economi.~t lies i11 economic 
biology . . But biological conceptions are 
11wn- complex than those of mechanics; a 
volume on Fmmdations must therefore give 
a relatively large place to mechanical 
a11alogies, and frequent use is made of the 
term equilibrium which suggests something of 
a static analogy (Alfred Marshall 1948, p. 
xiv) 
T HIS FAMOUS PASSAGE from Alfred Marshall's Principles of Economics 
(it first appeared in the fifth edition 
which came out in 1907) nicely brings 
out two issues, which are as germane to 
economics today as they were when Mar-
shall wrote. The first is the heavy reli-
ance by economists in their formal 
theorizing on the notion of "equilib-
rium." The other is the appeal that "bio-
logical conceptions" have for many 
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economists, particularly when their focus 
is on economic change. 
Marshall clearly believed that our sci-
ence should aim to understand economic 
change and not simply the forces mold-
ing and sustaining the current configura-
tion of economic variables. His "me-
chanical analogies" and equilibrium 
concepts included those of Newtonian 
dynamics, as well as those associated 
with the balancing of forces on bodies at 
rest. Since the time of Marshall, and fol-
lowing his lead, economists have devel-
oped their own equlibrium concepts. 
While until recently they were mostly as-
sociated with analysis of situations pre-
sumed to be at rest, in recent years 
much of economic theorizing has been 
concerned with dynamics, and the equili-
bria, like those of Newtonian dynamics, 
are ones in which the variables under 
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study change over time. But Marshall 
might observe that the equilibrium con-
cept in these models still somehow has a 
static feel to it. 
Few economists confuse the formal 
static or dynamic equilibrium theory 
with the reality. Most readily acknow-
ledge that at least some economic situ-
ations need to be understood as involv-
ing significant elements of novelty, so 
that the actors should be regarded as 
searching for a best action, as contrasted 
with actually having found it . In their 
analysis of certain economic phenomena, 
for example technical advance, many 
economists recognize that frequent or 
continuing shocks, generated internally 
as well as externally, may make it hazard-
ous to assume that the system ever will 
get to an equilibrium; thus the fixed or 
moving equilibrium in the theory must 
be understood as an "attractor" rather 
than a characteristic of where the system 
is . 
However, until recently at least, there 
has been a resistance to building these 
complications into formal models . Partly 
the reason is a belief that to do so would 
make the models intractable, or at least 
complex and difficult to understand. This 
seems to have been Marshall 's concern . 
But nowadays this predilection seems 
more than simply a matter of analytic 
tractability and convenience. When ex-
pressly doing or talking theory, unlike 
Marshall most contemporary economists 
seem to be drawn to equilibrium con-
cepts as a matter of aesthetics . General 
equilibrium theories are seen as elegant, 
and theories that depart from these can-
ons are seen as somewhat ad hoc. 
It is interesting, therefore, that when 
economists are describing or explaining 
particular empirical subject matter in a 
context that does not demand that they 
write or talk theory explicitly, they often 
eschew equilibrium language, and reveal 
the same inclination as did Marshall to 
make use of "biological conceptions" or 
metaphors. I noted above the proclivity 
of many economists to consider individu-
als and organizations as entities that 
search and "learn." Industrial organiza-
tion economists sometimes characterize 
certain industries as "young" and others 
as "mature" with the connotation that 
various things naturally happen as an in-
dustry gets older (see e.g., Dennis Muel-
ler and John Tilton 1969). Similar lan-
guage often is used in comparing 
economies. Evolutionary or developmen-
tal language is used quite widely by 
economists to describe how the structure 
of an economy, or an industry, or tech-
nology, or the law, changes over time. 
Writings in economic history almost in-
variably are full of such biological meta-
phors. 
All this is reminiscent of Marshall. Yet 
while he was attracted to "biological con-
. ceptions," it is apparent that Marshall 
never had in mind simply applying bio-
logical theory to economics. Indeed, the 
fact that he felt himself forced to fall 
back on "mechanical analogies" tells us 
that he found it very difficult to develop 
a formal theory, based on "biological 
conceptions, " that he thought adequate 
for economic analysis. 
In the years since Marshall, not many 
economists have even tried. (For a splen-
did history of evolutionary theorizing in 
economics, see Geoffrey Hodgson 1993.) 
Indeed, while some contemporary 
economists continue to feel the same 
tension as did Marshall, that group 
seems definitely a minority. One cer-
tainly can rationalize the two different 
styles of economic discourse and analysis 
as just what one would expect, given 
their purposes. Describing, and explain-
ing, in a context where it is important to 
be sensitive to the details , is one thing. 
Theorizing is quite another. 
However this proposition is problem-
atic on at least two counts . First, the far-
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ther the language of particular explana-
tion is from the logic of formal theory, 
the less analytic structure the latter can 
provide the former. Economists who 
would eschew equilibrium language, and 
use "biological conceptions" in describ-
ing and explaining, must pay an analytic 
price. Those who do implicitly are taking 
a position that the analytic structure of 
equilibrium theory misses elements they 
regard as essential to their story, and 
thus are willing to pay that price. 
And second, the argument draws too 
sharp a line between formal theorizing 
and verbal economic explanation . Winter 
and I have argued that , because the real 
economic world is so complex, theorizing 
about it tends to proceed at at least two 
different levels of abstraction (Nelson 
and Winter HJ82, pp. 46-48). Formal 
theorizing is one level. By formal theo-
rizing we mean what economists do 
when they are self consciously putting 
forth a theoretical argument. 
But economists also need to be under-
stood as "theorizing" when they are try-
ing to explain what lies behind the par-
ticular phenomena they are describing, 
even when they are not advertising their 
account as a "theory." \Vinter and I have 
called this kind of analysis "appreciative" 
theorizing. While starting with the em-
pirical subject matter, the accounts put 
forth by economists of the development 
of an industry, or the evolution of a tech-
nology. focus on certain variables and 
ignore others, just as is the case with 
formal theory. Quite complex causal ar-
guments often are presented as parts of 
these accounts , if generally in the form 
of stories. 
Thus the difference between the lan-
guage and the logic of economists' sto-
ries about economic growth, which often 
involve evolutionary or developmental 
concepts, and that of equilibrium theory, 
is described inappropriately as a differ-
ence between description and theory. 
The difference is between two different 
kinds of theories, in the sense that the 
mechanisms and relationships treated as 
causal are different, or at least appear to 
be. 
One could respond by arguing that, 
while the language may be different, in 
fact the substance of theories using "bio-
logical conceptions" and equilibrium 
theories is not very different. In particu-
lar, the theories predict much the same 
things. There is no real difference be-
tween saying that firms literally maxi-
mize, and saying that their behaviors 
have been learned through trial , error, 
and correction, and in some cases have 
been selected through the competitive 
process. Thus extant actors behave "as if' 
they maximize. (The classic statement of 
this position is , of course, Milton Fried-
man's, 1953.) 
Economists are not alone in putting 
forth this aq~ument . A number of evolu-
tionary theorists in biology do also . Both 
the economists and the biologists who 
take this position admit that , at any par-
ticular time, the actual system may not 
be precisely in equilibrium, but propose 
that it generally is close enough so that 
the characteristics of equilibrium tell 
one a lot about the actual situation. 
But economists who use the language 
of development and evolution in telling 
their stories apparently do not believe 
that concepts like optimiZation and equi-
librium can explain adequately the phe-
nomena they are addressing, and these 
economists have kindred souls in biol-
ogy. Many students of biological evolu-
tion strongly deny the proposition that 
"optimization" provides a meaningful ex-
planation for the character of extant liv-
ing forms, even when the observed con-
figuration seems relatively durable and 
stable (see e.g., Stephen Gould 1980). It 
has been argued that the process of evo-
lution is strongly path dependent and 
there is no unique selection equilibrium. 
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Any "optimizing" characteristics of what 
exists therefore must be understood as 
local and myopic, associated with the 
particular equilibrium that happens to 
obtain. The heart of any explanation of 
extant · living forms thus must be evolu-
tionary analysis of how the particular 
equilibrium, . and not a different one, 
came to be. Further, often there is good 
reason to suspect that evolution pres-
ently is going on at a relatively rapid 
rate, and thus equilibrium of any kind is 
not an appropriate concept for analysis. 
It would appear that many economists 
who use developmental and evolutionary 
language have in mind notions like these. 
While, as we shall see, the economists 
using evolutionary language in their 
theorizing arc not of one ilk, almost all 
are, in effect, positing that to say that 
actors behave "as if' they were maximiz-
ing does not tell us much abont why they 
arc doing what they are, and provides 
only a start on any prediction of what 
they will end up doing if conditions 
change. Many clearly believe that path 
dependency is important in economics, 
and a number argue that the phenomena 
in which they are interested must be un-
derstood as associated with continuing 
disequilibrium, not equilibrium. 
Until recently economists have used 
the language of evolution almost exclu-
sively in their appreciative theorizing. 
However, in recent years evolutionary 
concepts have been employed increas-
ingly in formal evolutionary theorizing. 
The book published by Sidney Winter 
and myself just over a decade ago (Nel-
son and Winter 1982) has been followed 
by a number of others also exploring for-
mal evolutionary theorizing in econom-
ics. (See among others Dosi et al. 1988; 
Paolo Saviotti and Metcalfe 1991; Philip 
Anderson, Kenneth Arrow, and David 
Pines 1988; Richard Day and Gunnar 
Eliasson 1986; Norman Clark and 
Calestous Juma 1987; Lars Magnusson 
1994.) Several recent articles have can-
vassed the new writing. (See for example 
Chris De Bresson 1987; and Richard 
Langlois and Michael Everett 1992.) Ul-
rich Witt (1992) has pulled together a 
collection of what he regards as classic 
articles in evolutionary theory. Hodgson 
(1993) has provided an elegant analytic 
history of evolutionary theorizing in eco-
nomics, and a forceful argument that 
Marshall was right about Mecca. In 1991 
a new journal of Evolutionary Econom-
ics was founded, and several other new 
journals have advertised an interest in 
evolutionary economics. 
The recent work on formal evolution-
ary economic theories has had several 
distinct, if connected, sources. One is 
the influence of developments in evolu-
tionary theory in biolob'Y· and sociobiol-
ogy, and the attempts to extend these 
lines of analysis to explain the evolution 
of human patterns of cooperation, co-
ordination, and social behavior more 
generally. While originally an intellectual 
field dominated by scholars outside of 
economics, a number of economists have 
t.•ome to be attracted both by the ques-
tions, and some of the analytic ideas. 
(See e.g., Jack Hirshleifer and Juan Car-
los Martinez-Coll 1988.) 
My review will describe these develop-
ments. However, I will argue that the 
ideas developed to date in evolutionary 
sociobiology are not adequate to deal 
with the questions of most interest to 
economists concerned with long run eco-
nomic change, for example the evolution 
of technologies and institutions. 
The development of evolutionary 
game theory has drawn extensively on 
these ideas, but probably should be re-
garded as a field in its own right, with its 
own questions, and methods (H. -Peyton 
Young 1993; Michihiro Kandori, George 
Mailath, and Rafael Rob 1993; Daniel 
Friedman 1991). The focus is on re-
peated games, and the problem of multi-
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pie Nash equilibria that is characteristic 
of such. The analytic tack that unifies a 
quite diverse body of writing is to specify 
an "evolutionary" process that is opera-
tive on the set of employed strategies, 
and to explore whether or not extant 
strategies converge to a steady state and, 
if so, the chara<.:teristics of such an equi-
librium. 
My review here will be concerned 
mostly with evolutionary analysis of long 
run and continuing economic change, 
and thus will deal only very selectively 
with evolutionary game theory. How-
ever, the notion that there may be multi-
ple equilibria, and that an understanding 
of which one, if any, will be achieved 
may require an analysis of "out of equi-
librium·· behavior (i.e ., that equilibrium 
is "path dependent") is very germane to 
the review presented here. 
Heeent developments in under-
standing of the mathematics of nonlinear 
dynamic systems, and recognition that 
many physical systems display properties 
that such dynamic models can explain 
and illuminate, is yet another stimulus to 
evolutionary theorizing in economics 
(Ilya Prigogene and Isabelle Stengers 
1984; David Lane 1993). While some of 
this new analytic understanding has been 
employed in evolutionary game theory, 
and indeed evolutionary game theory 
might be considered a special case of 
models of complex dynamic systems, two 
features of the more general formulation 
are relevant here. First, for the most part 
(there are exceptions) evolutionary game 
theory continues an older tradition in 
game theory of thinking of a given finite 
set of (basic) strategies, with equilibrium 
being defined in terms of these or mixes 
of these. In contrast, in the more general 
formulation an equilibrium, if there is 
any such, is seen as emerging out of the 
dynamic process, and often involves pat-
terns of behavior and activities that were 
absent early in the process. The number 
and nature of possible equilibria thus 
often cannot be specified ex ante . Sec-
ond, while concerned with certain regu-
larity properties in the time series, writ-
ers who identify their work as analysis of 
complex dynamic systems seem quite 
ready to believe that the system always 
will be "out of equilibrium." 
Much of the work on complex dynamic 
systems is carried out through computer 
simulation. The tremendous increase in 
the power of computers, and the recent 
availability of programming languages 
and techniques that greatly facilitate 
simulation of complex dynamic systems, 
however, should be regarded as a factor 
in its own right that has stimulated the 
development of formal evolutionary 
theorizing in economics. To recall the 
quote from Marshall that began this es-
say, the complexity of "hiological con-
ceptions," in particular evolutionary pro-
cesses, no longer poses the same analytic 
obstacles as was the case in the time of 
Marshall-or even twenty years ago. 
Earlier I suggested that the appeal of 
equilibrium formal theorizing in eco-
nomics was much more than a matter of 
computational feasibility, but reflected 
as well notions of aesthetics and ele-
gance . But elegance is in the eye of the 
beholder. Those working with the new 
models of dynamic complex systems 
clearly are developing a sense of aesthet-
ics of their own . And appreciation of a 
different kind of elegance seems to be 
spreading among economists. 
All of the developments above have 
contributed to the rise of a body of writ-
ing by economists and kindred scholars 
who are interested in understanding and 
explaining aspects or sources of long run 
economic change, and have developed 
quite explicit and self consciously evolu-
tionary models for that purpose . These 
writings are the focus of this essay. I will 
be concerned with evolutionary theoriz-
ing that arises out of empirical research, 
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as contrasted with studies that develop 
evolutionary models or arguments be-
cause they are interesting in their own 
right, and which bring in empirical cases 
mainly as examples. Much, if not all, of 
this evolutionary theorizing has been de-
veloped by the authors because they 
have felt that "mechanical analogies" 
simply would not do for their task, and 
that "biological conceptions" were more 
illuminating. And in contrast with most 
earlier writing, these writers have made 
their evolutionary theorizing explicit. 
Like Marshall, most of these writers, 
while drawn to biological conceptions or 
metaphors, have resisted simply transfer-
ring evolutionary concepts used in biol-
ogy to their area of inquiry, but rather 
have tried to analyze the evolutionary dy-
namics at work there in its own right. 
This has not always proved easy. In many 
cases the processes involved appear to 
be, when they are looked at closely, 
quite complex. Also, there still is little 
experience that can be drawn upon in 
c.-onstructing an evolutionary theory ger-
mane to economic change. The studies I 
will review here are highly varied reflect-
ing not only their different subject mat-
ter, but also the authors' particular ways 
of formulating an "evolutionary" theory. 
All of the theories considered here are 
formal theories, in that they have been 
explicitly put forth by their authors as a 
theory to explain particular phenomena. 
Some are expressed mathematically; 
some in words. The distinction that Win-
ter and I made between formal and ap-
preciative theorizing did not hinge on 
the media of exposition, although almost 
invariably theory expressed mathemati-
cally is formal theory in our terms. In 
our terms the hallmark of a formal the-
ory is the explicit setting out of a causal 
account, however expressed. A highly 
relevant question, of course, is the logi-
cal coherence of the theoretical state-
ment. Here, the use of mathematics 
would seem to help, but the history of 
economic thought displays many coher-
ent verbal theories, and some incoherent 
mathematical ones. 
The remainder of this article is orga-
nized as follows. In the following section 
I draw out the similarities, and differ-
ences, between the evolutionary eco-
nomic theories I will be examining, and 
evolutionary theory in biology and socio-
biology. 
I turn next to the evolutionary theories 
that are the focus of this essay. Section 
III is concerned with a group of evolu-
tionary theories about particular phe-
nomena associated with long run eco-
nomic change: science, technology. 
business organization, and law. Sections 
IV and V deal with evolutionary theories 
that treat clusters of coevolving vari-
ables, the former with models of eco-
nomic growth driven hy technical ad-
vance, the latter with the coevolution of 
technology and industry structure . Sec-
tions VI and VII are concerned with or-
ganizations and institutions. 
In the concluding section I reflect on 
the present state of evolutionary theoriz-
ing in economics. I also will attempt to 
sharpen the discussion of the ways in 
which evolutionary theorizing is differ-
ent from neoclassical theorizing, and to 
propose some criteria that might enable 
one to evaluate the strengths and weak-
nesses of the alternatives. Some econo-
mists would argue that that issue ought 
to hinge on the quality of the predic-
tions, but I will suggest that the issue is 
too complex for that. 
II. What Are the Characteristics of an 
Evolutionary Theory? 
What are the characteristics of an 
"evolutionary theory" of economic 
change, as contrasted with theories of 
economic change that employ "mechani-
cal analogies"? In what ways are eco-
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nomic evolutionary theories similar to 
evolutionary theories in biology and so-
ciobiology, and in what ways different? 
These are the questions addressed in this 
section. 
A. Evolutio11ary Theory as a General 
Theory 
One way tel define evolutionary theory 
in general would be to start from biol-
ogy, wbere evolutionary theory is best 
worked out, and explore where one can 
find close analogies to the variables and 
concepts of that theory in other areas of 
inquiry-in this case economics. How-
ever I believe that following this route 
would tie the discussion much too 
closely to biology. After all, as Hodgson 
( Hl\:.13) has discussed at some length, the 
term "evolution" was in wide use long 
before it took on meaning as the name of 
a particular theory in biology. 
I believe that much of the appeal of 
evolutionary language in economics is 
connected with the broader use of the 
term, as contrasted with its specific use 
in biology. Further, to start with biology 
risks getting stuck in notions that, while 
salient in biological evolution, seem ir-
relevant or wrong-headed when applied 
to economics . It seems more fruitful to 
start with a general notion of evolution, 
and then examine applications in specific 
areas-like biology or economics-as 
special cases. 
The general concept of evolutionary 
theory that I propose, and employ in this 
essay, involves the following elements. 
The focus of attention is on a variable or 
set of them that is changing over time 
and the theoretical quest is for an under-
standing of the dynamic process behind 
the observed change; a special case 
would be a quest for understanding of 
the current state of a variable or a sys-
tem in terms of how it got there. The 
theory proposes that the variable or sys-
tem in question is subject to somewhat 
random variation or perturbation, and 
also that there are mechanisms that sys-
tematically winnow on that variation. 
Much of the predictive or explanatory 
power of that theory rests with its speci-
fication of the systematic selection 
forces. It is presumed that there are 
strong inertial tendencies preserving 
what has survived the selection process. 
However, in many cases there are also 
forces that continue to introduce new va-
riety, which is further grist for the selec-
tion mill. 
All of the evolutionary theories of eco-
nomic change I will discuss have these 
characteristics. They also are central, of 
course, in evolutionary theory in biology. 
However, biology makes heavy use of 
other concepts that, by and large, are not 
used in in economics. The fact that sexu-
ality and mating play a major role in the 
evolution of many species is important in 
biology but seldom used in economics. 
The concept of generations is used in bi-
ology, but does not apply easily to analy-
ses of the evolution of technologies, 
firms, or institutions. 
On the other hand, in some of the 
theories considered here the new "vari-
ety" that is created as grist for winnow-
ing is systematically oriented toward new 
departures that seem appropriate to the 
context. That is, there is a directionally 
adaptive aspect to the innovation pro-
cess. Also, what entities "learn" in such 
processes may, in some models, be 
passed on to other entities. That is, some 
of the economic evolutionary theories 
are Lamarkian, a version of evolutionary 
theory that has been discredited in biol-
ogy. Some emphasize group selection. 
Other aspects that distinguish economic 
models from biological ones will be de-
veloped along the way. 
In any case, the proposed general defi-
nition of an evolutionary process cer-
tainly rules out certain theories of 
change, for example those that are 
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wholly deterministic. Thus under this 
definition, as apparently under Mar-
shall's conception, Kepler's laws of 
planetary motion, together with New-
ton's gravitational theory that explains 
them, would not define an evolutionary 
theory. Nor would the standard neoclas-
sical theory of economic growth, which 
basically presumes a moving general 
equilibrium, be regarded as an evolu-
tionary theory. Neither would the execu-
tion of a detailed plan for the construc-
tion of a building, or any realization of a 
pre-specified blueprint, be considered 
an evolutionary process. 
On the other hand the definition I am 
proposing also rules out theories of 
change where all the action is "random," 
as certain models in economics that pur-
port that within an industry the growth 
or decline of particular firms is a random 
variable, possibly related to the size of 
the firm at any time, but otherwise not 
analyzable (see e .g., Herbert Simon and 
Charles Bonini 1958) . One can trace 
through the random processes built into 
such models and predict the distribution 
of firm sizes at any time, for example 
that under certain specifications it will 
asymtotically become . log normal. But 
under the definition presented here, 
these models would not be considered 
evolutionary models of economic change. 
But revise the building construction 
story as follows . Assume that the original 
house design is a tentative one, because 
the builder is not exactly sure how to 
achieve what he or she wants, and thus 
the plan initially contains certain ele-
ments without any firm commitment to 
them, indeed that are there partly by 
chance. As the building gets constructed 
the builder gets a better idea of what the 
present plans imply, and where the origi-
nal design is inadequate, and, where con-
struction in place permits, revises the 
plan and the path of construction accord-
ingly. Revise the firm growth model as 
follows. Assume that the firms differ in 
certain identifiable characteristics, and 
growth of those with certain ones turns 
out to be systematically greater than 
those that lack these. The industry 
gradually develops a structure in which 
only firms with these characteristics sur-
vive. 
Both models now contain both random 
and systematic elements. Further, in 
both the systematic ones act by winnow-
ing on the random ones. In the house 
design case, design elements turn out to 
please or displease the builder, and are 
accepted or rejected accordingly. In the 
industry evolution case, the "market" or 
something is selecting on firms that have 
certain attributes . A limitation of both 
stories is that neither is explicit about 
what it is that seems to give advantage. 
But both give hope that the analyst 
might be able to find out. Perhaps it is 
"cost per square foot" or "nicely shaped 
spaces" or some combination that ex-
plains why the builder revises the design 
as the information comes in. Perhaps it is 
production costs or ability to innovate 
that is determining whether firms thrive 
or fail. Of course the theory has limited 
explanatory power until the question of 
selection criteria gets answered. But if 
that question is answered adequately, 
the theory can explain, and to some ex-
tent predict. 
The analytic structure of these two ex-
amples is reminiscent of that of evolu-
tionary theory in biology, witho1,1t being 
clones of it. The latter, however, seems 
closer to theory in biology because it re-
fers to an actual population of things, 
while the former does not appear to, at 
least at first glance. In biology the use of 
the term evolutionary nowadays is firmly 
associated with analysis of actual popula-
tions of things. An embryo, or more gen-
erally a living creature, usually is de-
scribed as developing, not evolving. In 
part this use of language reflects a predi-
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lection discussed earlier-that change 
"according to a plan" is usually not re-
garded as evolutionary. However, it is 
recognized widely that many random oc-
currences will affect the development of 
an embryo or a tree. The prejudice 
against using the term "evolutionary" to 
describe such biological processes stems 
from the fact that the term has been 
preempted for use in describing another 
class of biological phenomena. However, 
is it clear that prejudice should carry 
over outside of biology? 
Consider our house builder, or an in-
dividual learning to play chess, or a firm 
trying to find a strategy for survival in a 
competitive industry. Our house builder 
can be regarded as having a number of 
plan variants, or perhaps as having one 
initially in mind but being aware that 
there are a set of possible changes that 
might turn out to be desirable . One can 
similarly regard the learning chess player 
or the firm. If firms, persons learning to 
play chess, or housebuilders , learn from 
experience and winnow or adapt their 
plans or strategies or behaviors, is it un-
reasonable to think of these as evolving? 
In reflecting on this, one might recog-
nize that the learning, or adaptation, can 
be modeled in terms of a change in the 
probability distribution of possible ac-
tions that entity might take at any time, 
coming about as a result of feedback 
from what has been tried, and the conse-
quences . These "learning" equations 
have basically the same form as the 
equations that describe the evolution of 
populations. (See e.g., John Holland et 
al. 1986.) 
There is no great value in extended in-
tellectual haggling about the precise 
boundaries which demarcate models of 
change that can be called evolutionary 
from those that should not be. As indi-
cated, I choose to use the term "evolu-
tionary" to define a class of theories, or 
models, or arguments, that have the fol-
lowing characteristics. First, their pur-
pose is to explain the movement of 
something over time, or to explain why 
that something is what it is at a moment 
in time in terms of how it got there; that 
is, the analysis is expressly dynamic. Sec-
ond, the explanation involves both ran-
dom elements which generate or renew 
some variation in the variables in ques-
tion, and mechanisms that systematically 
winnow on extant variation. Third, there 
are inertial forces that provide continuity 
of what survives the winnowing. 
The variation in the theory can be as-
sociated with an actual variety which ex-
ists at any time-as a distribution of 
genotypes or phenotypes, or firm poli-
cies. Alternately, it may characterize a 
set of potential values of a variable, only 
one of which is manifest at any time. 
Thus I would include theories of individ-
ual, organizational, or cultural learning 
and adaptation under my umbrella, if 
they fit other characteristics. Indeed, as 
we shall see, a characteristic of many of 
the economic evolutionary theories we 
will examine is that individual learning, 
organizational adaptation, and environ-
mental selection of organizations, all are 
going on at the same time. 
B. Evolutionary Theory in Biology 
As is the case with any active scientific 
field , there is far from full agreement on 
all matters among modern biologists, 
ethnologists, paleontologists, and other 
scientists concerned with biological evo-
lution. However, the following sketch 
captures that part of the generally 
agreed upon core that is most useful to 
lay out for our purposes in this essay, as 
well as some of the relevant bones of 
contention. (The following draws from 
many sources, but especially Richard Le-
wontin 1974; Elliott Sober 1984; David 
Hull 1988; and Ernst Mayr 1988.) 
The theory is concerned with two ac-
tual populations as contrasted with po-
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tential ones. One is the population of 
genotypes, defined as the genetic inheri-
tance of living creatures. The second is 
the population of phenotypes, defined in 
terms of a set of variables that happen to 
be of interest to the analyst, but which 
include those that influence the "fitness" 
of each living creature. These might in-
clude physical aspects like size, or sight, 
behavioral patterns like song, or re-
sponses to particular contingencies like 
something that can be eaten and is 
within reach, or a potential mate, or a 
member of one's own "group" soliciting 
help. 
Phenotypic characteristics are pre-
sumed to be influenced by genotypic 
ones, but not uniquely determined by 
them. Modern evolutionary theory rec-
ognizes that the development of a living 
creature from its origins to its pheno-
typic characteristics at any time can be 
influenced by the environment through 
which it passes-whether there was ade-
quate food supply when it was young or 
not, or the fact that it lost an eye in an 
accident . Modern evolutionary theory 
also recognizes a variety of learning ex-
periences which shape the behavior of a 
phenotype, including how it was taught 
by its mother, whether particular behav-
iors early in life were rewarded, etc. 
However, if we hold off for a moment 
considering evolutionary theory that rec-
ognizes "culture" as something that can 
be transferred across generations, the 
hallmark of standard biological evolu-
tionary theory is that only the genes, not 
any acquired characteristics or behavior, 
get passed on across the generations. 
The notion of "generations" is basic to 
biological evolutionary theory. The phe-
notypes get born, live, reproduce (at 
least some of them do), and die (in most 
species ultimately all of them do) . On 
the other hand, the genes get carried 
over to their offspring, who follow the 
same generational life cycle. Thus the 
genes provide the continuity of the evo-
lutionary system, with the actual living 
creatures acting, from one point of view, 
as their transporters from generation to 
generation. For species that produce this 
way, sexuality provides a mechanism for 
combining genotypes in a manner that 
may create new ones . Mutations also cre-
ate new genotypes. On the other hand 
selection winnows on the genetic variety 
through differential reproduction by 
(pairs of) phenotypes which augments 
the relative frequency of the genes of 
the more successful reproducers and di-
minishes that of the less. 
In the generally held interpretation of 
this theory (there are other or more 
complex interpretations as well) , selec-
tion operates directly on the phenotypes. 
It is they, not their genes per se, that are 
more or less fit . To repeat what was 
stressed above, phenotypes are not 
uniquely determined by genotypes. 
However the theory assumes a strong 
enough relationship between the two so 
that systematic selection on phenotypes 
results in systematic selection on geno-
types. 
There are several controversial , or at 
least open , aspects of this theory that are 
germane to our discussion here . For 
economists perhaps the most interesting 
question is whether, and if so in what 
sense, evolution can be understood to 
"optimize" fitness . 
The optimization notion here clearly 
has roots in Herbert Spencer's notions 
( 1887) of "survival of the fittest," and the 
implicit context is one in which competi-
tion among members of a population is 
sufficiently fierce that only the "fittest" 
survive. In recent years theorists have 
formalized this idea as a game for sur-
vival, and developed the concept of an 
"evolutionarily stable strategy" as the 
equilibrium solution to that game. (See 
e.g., Maynard Smith 1982.) The concept 
of "strategy" in these models is broad 
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enough to encompass any phenotypic 
characteristic that matters for survival, 
and the strategies that survive in equilib-
rium are those that can best (at least 
small numbers of) other pre-specified 
strategies in the survival game. 
In what sense is what survives opti-
mal? The semantic correspondance be-
tween between survival and optimality 
seems most straightforward if the 
"game" is about different kinds of strate-
gies passively competing for the same 
environmental "niche," and one type_ 
wins out . The winner might be under-
stood as the most efficient forager, or 
something like that. However, things get 
somewhat more complicated if the game 
isn't simply about passive competition 
for a niche, but includes some strategies 
that involve attacking competitors of 
other sorts. then both efficient foraging 
and fighting prowess count in defining 
optimal, if that term is to be used to 
characterize what survives . 
Even in such simple contexts, there 
are some subtleties that qualify the asso-
ciation of what "survives" with "optimal." 
For one thing, how a strategy fares in a 
series of plays of a game depends on the 
mix of strategies with which it competes. 
Thus what survives depends on what else 
is competing iq the game. More, if the 
number of individuals associated with 
any particular strategy is finite, the very 
process of competition may eliminate 
along the path to an equilibrium strate-
gies that would be in a stable equilib-
rium set as calculated ex ante . That is, 
the equilibrium may be strongly path de-
pendent. (See e .g., Hirshleifer and 
Martinez-Coll 1988.) 
Other complications come into view 
when one recognizes that "strategies" 
may have many aspects, and these may 
interact strongly in determining ability to 
compete and survive in a given environ-
ment. Thus being an effective predator 
requires a package of attributes, ability 
to get at the leaves on tall trees a differ-
ent package. But then, whether a "gene" 
or an aspect of a strategy enhances sur-
vival or not may be strongly dependent 
upon the other genes or aspects of strat-
egy. And a "mutation" that may be lethal 
in one species or strategy, may be help-
ful in another. Thus if strategies them-
selves evolve, they likely do so in a 
strongly path dependent way. 
There may be important interactions 
across coexisting phenotypes-strategies. 
The existence of giraffes provides oppor-
tunites for large strong predators . But 
the number of the latter that can survive 
in equilibrium may depend on the num-
ber of the former, and vice versa. In turn 
the ecological equilibrium depends on 
the number of trees and the leaves that 
are available to giraffes. The emergence 
of an insect whose caterpillars feed on 
leaves of the tall trees may bring down 
the whole ecosystem. 
Also, a number of students of biologi-
cal evolution have argued that the selec-
tion environment almost never is con-
stant (see e.g., Gould 1980, 1985). The 
_insect population may get large, and 
then itself collapse after it has dimin-
ished the population of live trees . If the 
selection environment is not a constant, 
the phenotypes extant today may be 
strongly shaped by those that survived in 
a possibly very different environment 
some time ago (say giraffes that can eat 
the leaves of low bushes that th~ cater-
pillars do not like), and the offspring 
they had, as well as recent winnowing on 
the group extant yesterday. Again, the 
equilibrium is strongly path dependent, 
and today's "optimum" may be very local 
and likely poor stuff compared to what 
might have been. 
Gould, among others, says he reads 
the evidence as indicating that the selec-
tion environment not only changes, but 
on many occasions is relatively lax. In a 
loose selection environment different 
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phenotypes may grow in number more 
rapidly than others largely due to a com-
bination of breeding capability and luck, 
rather than any special capabilities for 
"survival" in the environment in ques-
tion. The same authors argue that the ex-
tinction of particular phenotypes usually 
is the result of catastrophes that hap-
pened to hit clusters of them, rather 
than the result of losing a competition 
with other phenotypes. 
One also can ask what meaning there 
is to the optimality concept in a context 
in which mutation continues to go on, 
and some of the mutations enhance fit-
ness, at least in prevailing environments. 
Modem evolutionary biology is not sim-
ply about selection pressures on extant 
phenotypes, but also about changes that 
appear from time to time in species, and 
also about the origins of new species. 
These latter phenomena would seem to 
require analysis of evolutionary pro-
cesses that involve not only out-of-equi-
librium behavior, but also the emergence 
of novelty. (See e.g., Walter Fontana and 
Leo Buss 1992; and Lane 1993.) 
C. Sociobiology 
As indicated, animal behavior has, for 
a long time, been a "phenotypic" charac-
teristic of interest to evolutionary theo-
rists. That behavior often involves, in an 
essential way, modes of interaction with 
fellow members of one's species. Over 
the last thirty years an important subdis-
cipline has grown up concerned with ex-
actly these kinds of social behavior pat-
terns . Much of this has been concerned 
with nonprimate animals-insect colo-
nies, bird families and flocks, etc. A size-
able portion of it has, however, been 
concerned with humans. The part of the 
sociobiology literature concerned with 
nonhumans recognizes that learned be-
havior can be passed down from genera-
tion to generation, but in general has 
presumed, first, that the particular capa-
bilities to learn and to transmit to off-
spring are tied to genes, and second, that 
the "learning" does not progress from 
generation to generation . To the extent 
that these behaviors enhance fitness, 
there is selection on the genes that facili-
tate them, according to the arguments 
sketched above. But learned behavior 
does not follow a cross generational path 
of its own. 
The early work by Edward Wilson on 
the biological bases of human social be-
havior carried over basically this model. 
However, in subsequent writings by 
Charles Lumsden and Edward Wilson 
(1981), and by other scholars interested 
in extending evolutionary theory in biol-
ogy so as to be able to treat human cul-
ture, prominently Luigi Cavalli-Sforza 
and Marcus Feldman ( 1981), Robert 
Boyd and Peter Richerson (1985), and 
William Durham (1991), human culture 
was recognized as something that could 
be modified, and improved, from genera-
tion to generation, and which had its 
own rules of transmission. These latter 
models all do presume a basic genetic 
biological capacity of humans for the de-
velopment and transmission of culture. 
But beyond that these models treat the 
connections between the evolution of 
human behavior and culture, and genetic 
evolution, as something far more com-
plex than that assumed in the models of 
insect and bird societies . 
There are a number of important dif-
ferences among these models. Thus 
Lumsden and Wilson, and Cavalli-Sforza 
and Feldman, tend to treat elements of 
culture as something that directly deter-
mine what people do and how effectively 
they do it, while Boyd and Richerson, 
and especially Durham, treat culture as 
prominently involving understandings 
and values that, like genes, influence be-
havior or capabilities, but do not directly 
determine these. Perhaps the most im-
portant difference among these models 
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is the extent to which biology is seen as 
constraining and molding culture beyond 
the preconditions that all of these theo-
ries recognize. Put in the terms coined 
by Wilson, there are sharp disagree-
ments regarding how long the "leash," 
and the extent to which evolution of cul-
ture itself has significantly extended the 
length of that "leash ." Here Lumsden 
and Wilson are far closer to the animal 
sociobiology models than the other 
authors. 
For the purposes of the discussion 
here, I want to focus on certain com-
monalities of the theories in this litera-
ture, which, I believe limit their range of 
applicability. In particular, all of them 
use as their examples relatively simple 
practices or artifacts or ideas or norms 
which can easily be thought of as being 
transmitted from person to person . Each 
tries to break down "culture" into small 
"gene like" subunits, which are assigned 
terms like meme, or culturgen. The sim-
ple technology-artifacts and beliefs em-
ployed as examples are a far distance 
from complex technologies like those as-
sociated with making semiconductors or 
aircraft, or scientific theories like that of 
biological evolution itself, or systems like 
patent law. While teachers and opinion 
leaders are admitted as "transmitters" or 
"influencers," there is nothing in these 
studies like universities, or scientific so-
cieties . Various forms of human organi-
zation are discussed, but there is no 
treatment of organizations like industrial 
R & D laboratories, or business firms 
more generally, or elections or legisla-
tures, or courts. 
Most of the analyses clearly recognize 
that in principle an element of culture 
can spread for reasons that have little to 
do with enhancing individual biological 
fitness, in any straightfmward manner, 
and some stress that as a general propo-
sition. Boyd and Richerson even present 
a model example in which the profes-
sional life of, say, a teacher, or a member 
of the clergy, is assumed to carry attrac-
tions of its own, but those who follow the 
calling actually have a smaller number of 
offspring than those who do not. Mem-
bership in the profession as a whole is 
sustained intergenerationally by new re-
cruits. However, none of these analyses 
attempts to come to grips with the paths 
of cumulative evolution taken by cultural 
structures like science, technology, the 
law, standard forms of business organiza-
tion, and the like, which clearly have 
been drawn and shaped by particular 
value systems, and particular mecha-
nisms for inducing and winnowing 
change. 
While important and interesting in its 
own right, the body of writing on cul-
tural evolution that traces its origins to 
biological evolutionary theory, and then 
makes a sharp break, has not as yet tried 
to come to grips with the dynamics of 
change in modern industrial societies. To 
do so requires, it would seem, building 
into evolutionary analysis much more of 
the institutional complexity of modern 
societies than the literature above has 
hazarded thus far. Boyd and Richerson 
recognize this explicitly when they re-
mark, 
Understanding the institutional complexity of 
modern societies will require the mating of 
micro-level theory like the one we have de-
veloped here with the more aggregated one 
of Nelson and Winter. (Boyd and Richerson 
1985, p. 296) 
This is just what the various studies we 
shall consider in the following sections 
have tried to do, if with varying levels of 
success. 
III. The Evolution of Particular Aspects 
of Culture 
There are three key differences be-
tween the evolutionary theories I con-
sider here, and in the following sections, 
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and those in sociobiology. First, there 
are no ties whatsoever between the cul-
tural selection criteria and processes and 
biological fitness. Any coevolution in 
these theories is not between memes and 
genes , but between various elements of 
culture. 
Second, the authors of the theories 
considered here are interested in ex-
plaining how and why a particular aspect 
of "'culture" changed over time the way 
it did. Because their explanation is in 
terms of the workings of an evolutionary 
process, this forces them to identify 
some particular characteristic of merit 
and selection mechanisms enforcing it 
that favors certain variants over others, 
or which reinforces certain behaviors or 
inclinations and damps others. The theo-
rists of biological and cultural coevolu-
tion discussed above have coined the 
term "cultural fitness," but seldom have 
got around to identifying it in particular 
cases where biological fitness is not an 
important variable at stake. Third, evolu-
tionary theorists, coming from sociobiol-
ogy, have by and large assumed selection 
mechanisms are individualistic, transmis-
sion mechanisms are person to person, 
and that '"memes" like genes are carried 
by individuals. Yet these perceptions 
seem quite inadequate for analysis of 
how science or modern technology 
evolves, or forms of business organiza-
tion, or law. 
This section will be concerned with 
evolutionary theories of just these ele-
ments of culture, all of them major and 
obviously intertwined aspects of the pro-
cess of long run economic change. The 
theories discussed in this section largely 
repress the intertwining. Each theory 
deals with just one of these variables 
which is viewed as proceeding on its 
own, as it were. In the following two sec-
tions we shall consider theories in which 
interdependence and coevolution are 
recognized. 
The collection of theories discussed in 
this section are all qualitative, and ex-
pressed verbally, as contrasted with be-
ing laid out mathematically. All are for-
mal theories, in the sense of being put 
forth as self-conscious abstractions about 
what is driving the dynamics of the vari-
ables in question. However, none is de-
veloped mathematically. And some seem 
much better posed analytically than .oth-
ers, in that the logic seems tighter. 
I also want to stress that each of the 
bodies of evolutionary theorizing dis-
cussed in this section is very large. My 
treatment of each, therefore , must be 
highly selective. My particular selection 
is designed not so much to be repre-
sentative of the literatures involved, as to 
bring out some analytic issues about evo-
lutionary theorizing. 
A. Science 
The proposition that science "evolves" 
has been around for some time, and 
there has been and continues to be a 
lively discussion about just how that evo-
lutionary process works . For the most 
part the vario~1s theories put forth do sat-
isfy my definition of what qualifies as an 
evolutionary theory. (For overviews see 
Henry Plotkin 1982; and David Hull 
1988.) 
Of recent writers in this vein, Donald 
Campbell (1960, 1974) probably is the 
most cited. Using Campbell 's term, the 
development of new scientific hypothe-
ses, or theories, is to some extent 
"blind," in that their originators cannot 
know for sure how they will fare when 
they are first put forth. Thus new scien-
tific theories are like "mutations" in that 
some will succeed and be incorporated 
into the body of science, perhaps replac-
ing older theories, or correcting them in 
some respects, or adding to them, and 
others will not succeed. Campbell relies 
largely on the ideas of Karl Popper 
(1968) for his "selection mechanism." 
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Under Popper's argument scientific.: 
theories never c.:an be proved true , but 
they c.:an he falsified. New theories that 
solve sc.:i entific.: problems and are not fal-
sified are added to the body of science. 
That is, employed and "not falsified" is 
the c.:harac.:terization of fitness in this the-
ory of sc.:ienc:e . For the most part Camp-
bell treats scienc.:e as a relatively unified 
body of doctrine, and his language im-
plies a sc.:ientific community together 
searc.:hing after truth, that is of c.:ollec.:tive 
evolutionary learning. On the other 
hand, his theory is compatible with the 
notion of individual scientists putting 
forth their particular theories in hope of 
winning a Nobel prize. A good case can 
be made that both images of science-
cooperative and competitive-are partly 
correct (see Hull HJ88) . 
In any c.:asl' thl' theory leaves open two 
questions. Tlw first is what determines 
which theories are tu be rigorously 
tested. and what is the standing of theo-
ries that have not been. "Theories" that 
have not (as of yet) been subject to rigor-
ous testing do not nec.:essarily have the 
same standing. Some may never be 
brought to a serious test simply because 
they are regarded as irrelevant, or on 
their face absurd. Others may fit so well 
with prevailing understanding that they 
are absorbed without direct testing. The 
second question is what falsification 
means; in many cases the conclusions of 
a test may be ambiguous, or there may 
be reason to question the way it was run, 
or whether it was appropriate. Often a 
theory which seems to fail a test can be 
patched up with a well crafted modifica-
tion or amendment. These issues open 
the door to a much more complicated 
theory of the evolution of science than at 
least the simple interpretation of Camp-
bell's. 
The "social constructionists" recognize 
and revel in these complications (see 
e .g., Bruno Latour 1986). They propose 
that very few theories, or scientific.: argu-
ments more generally, are ever com-
pletely falsified , or even put to a test that 
all would regard ex ante as conclusive. 
Thus sc.:ientific.: opinion is what matters 
and, in a c.:ontext where different indi-
viduals and groups have different opin-
ions , what is considered scientific fact 
and is published in reputed journals, 
taught to graduate students, etc.:., is 
largely a matter of scientific politics. 
Thomas Kuhn (1970) presents a view 
somewhat between Campbell and the so-
cial constructionists. On the one hand 
Kuhn proposes that most "normal sci-
ence" proceeds in almost unthinking ae-
ccptance of prevailing theory. aml that 
there is strong built-in <lisbelicf of re-
sults that challenge that theory. On the 
other hand, also central to Kuhn's theory 
of the evolution of science is that unan-
swered questions or anomalies tend to 
accumulate and, as they do, questions in-
creasingly are asked about the adequacy 
of prevailing theory. A stan<lard response 
of the scientific community is to propose 
modest modifications or additions to pre-
vailing theory. However these may not 
succeed or the developing theoretical 
structure may come to be seen as rococo. 
The seeds then are planted for a scien-
tific revolution. 
Neither Campbell nor Kuhn (in their 
earlier versions) address the issue of 
competing theories. However, such com-
petition is the heart of scientific revolu-
tions. Imre Lakatos ( 1970) proposes that 
broad theories should be regarded as de-
fining research programs. These pro-
grams can be judged by the community 
as proceeding effectively-that is as 
making good progress-or as more or 
less stuck. Lakatos proposes that there 
are almost always competing theories 
around. The one that defines the more 
effective research program tends to win 
out. But again, one can ask what defines 
"effective." A particular theory almost al-
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ways points to a number of predicted im-
plications, and exploring these defines a 
variety of puzzles and problems and 
tasks. A research program may be good 
in dealing with some of these, and not so 
effective on others. What counts? 
Note that several different "theories" 
of the evolution of science have been de-
scribed above. Some are in conflict. In 
particular the social constructionists 
would seem at odds with scholars, like 
Campbell, who believe that new scien-
tific hypotheses, or at least those taken 
seriously, are subject to test, and that 
enough of the tests are sufficiently ob-
jective and unambiguous to monitor the 
enterprise. (This also clearly is Hull's 
view.) Some of the theories are compat-
ible, and can be joined. Thus Kuhn 
might be regarded as providing an evolu-
tionary theory of science within a given 
research program, and Lakatos a theory 
which explains selection among compet-
ing programs. Regarding what criteria 
are used to weigh program effectiveness, 
later in this essay I shall suggest that part 
of the answer may reside in the connec-
tions between science and technology. 
Does science make progress? While 
the social constructionists seem strongly 
reserved about this, I think it fair to say 
that most of the theorists who propose 
that science evolves believe that the pro-
cess does generate progress, at least 
along the lines of research pursued. 
(This clearly is Hull's view.) While occa-
sionally we delude ourselves that we 
have understood something when we do 
not, and often the going toward better 
understanding is hard, by and large 
through science we have come to know 
more and more about nature a:nd how it 
works. Or at least this is the flavor of 
most of this body of theorizing. 
B. Technology 
A number of analysts have proposed 
that technology evolves. The analyses of 
Nathan Rosenberg (1976, 1982), Christo-
pher Freeman (1987), George Basalla 
(1988), Joel Mokyr (1990), Nelson and 
Winter (1977), Dosi (1988), and Walter 
Vincenti (1990) are strikingly similar in 
many respects. To keep the discussion 
below simple, I will follow the discussion 
of Vincenti. 
In Vincenti's theory, the community of 
technologists at any time faces a number 
of problems, challenges, and opportuni-
ties. He draws most of his examples from 
aircraft technology. Thus, in a new paper 
(Vincenti 1994) he observes that in the 
late 1920s and early 1930s, aircraft de-
signers knew well that the standard pat-
tern of hooking wheels to fuselage or 
wings could be improved upon, given the 
higher speeds planes were then capable 
of with the new body and wing designs 
and more powerful engines that had 
come into existence. They were aware of 
several different possibilities for incorpo-
rating wheels into a more streamlined 
design. Vincenti argues that trials of 
these different alternatives were, in the 
same sense put forth by Campbell, some-
what blind. This is not to say that the 
engineers thinking about and experi-
menting with solutions were ignorant 
either of the technical constraints and 
possibilities or of what was required of a 
successful design. Rather, his proposi-
tion is that, while professional knowl-
edge and appreciation of the goals 
greatly focused efforts at solution, there 
still were a number of different possibili-
ties, and engineers were uncertain about 
which would prove best, and disagreed 
among themselves as to where to place 
bets. 
This kind of uncertainty, together with 
the proposition that uncertainty is re-
solved only through ex post coinpetiton, 
is the hallmark of evolutionary theories. 
In this case it turned out that having the 
wheel be retractable solved the problem 
better than did the other alternatives ex-
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plored at that time. Thus, "fitness" here 
is defined in terms of solving particular 
technological problems better. 
One might propose that identification 
of this criterion only pushes the analytic 
problem back a stage. What determines 
whether one solution is better than an-
other? At times Vincenti writes as if the 
criterion were innate in the technologi-
cal problem, or determined by consensus 
of a technological community who are, 
like Campbell's community of scientists, 
cooperatively involved in advancing the 
art. 
However, Vincenti also recognizes that 
the aircraft designers are largely em-
ployed in a number of competing aircraft 
companies, whose profitability may be 
affected by the relative quality and cost 
of the aircraft designs they are employ-
ing, compared with those employed by 
their competitors. But then what is bet-
ter or worse in a problem solution is de-
termined at least partially by the "mar-
ket," the properties of an aircraft 
customers are willing to pay for, the 
costs associated with different design so-
lutions, etc. In the case of aircraft, the 
military is an important customer, as 
well as the airlines. Thus the evolution of 
aircraft at least partially reflects military 
demands and budgets, as well as civilian. 
As with the case of science, some 
authors dispute that the evolution of 
technology follows a path that might be 
considered as "progress," or even that 
there are any objective criteria for tech-
nological fitness. The book by Wiebe Bi-
jker, Thomas Hughes, and Trevor Pinch 
(1989) surveys various theories of "social 
construction" of technology. Michael 
Tushman and Lori Rosenkopf (1992) de-
velop a more nuanced view of social de-
terminism, but one which also implicitly 
denies the importance of economic effi-
ciency, save as a gross screen. On the 
other hand, evolutionary theorists of the 
development of technology of the Vin-
centi camp believe strongly that there is 
technological progress, and ask the 
reader who poubts to compare modern 
aircraft with those of fifty years ago, 
modern pharmaceuticals with those 
available before World War II, etc. 
In recent years a particular insight or 
qrgument has somewhat complicated this 
discussion. While those that profess that 
science "pr9gresses" generally seem to 
have in minp a unitary concept of "truth" 
toward whiCh science is going, recent 
scholarship on the evolution of technol-
ogy has proposed that there may be a 
number of different evolutionary tracks 
that go in quite different directions, and 
that movement down one may block 
movement down another. Thus the rapid 
evolution of gasoline-powered automo-
biles may have improved these, but at 
the same time may have scotched prog-
ress toward battery-powered cars. We 
will pick up this discussion in Section V. 
C. Business Organization 
Alfred Chandler's research (1962, 
1990) has been concerned with under-
standing how the complex structures that 
characterize modern multiproduct firms 
came into existence. For our purposes 
his story is especially interesting, in that 
it is a story of coevolution. The coevolu-
tion is not of genes and memes, but of 
technology and business organizations. 
He argues that a variety of technological 
developments occurred during the mid 
and late 19th century which opened up 
the possibility for business firms to be 
highly productive and profitable if they 
could organize to operate at large scales 
of output, and with a relatively wide if 
connected range of products. He de-
scribes various organizational innova-
tions that were tried, and while his 
central focus is on those that "suc-
ceeded," it is clear from his account that 
not all did. 
Arguing in a manner similar to Vin-
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centi, Chandler's "fitness criterion" i~ 
that the new organizational form solved 
an organizational problem. Presumably 
the solution to that problem enabled a 
firm to operate at lower costs, or with 
greater scale and scope, in either case, 
with greater profitability. Like Campbell 
and Vincenti, Chandler clearly sees a 
community, in this case of managers. But 
he also sees companies competing with 
each other. His argument is that compa-
nies which found and adopted efficient 
managerial styles and structural forms 
early won out over their competitors who 
did not, or who lagged in doing so. 
Oliver Williamson (1985), drawing from 
Chandler, but putting forth a much more 
explicit formal theory, proposes that a 
relatively sharp "fitness" criterion deter-
mined which organizational forms sur-
vived and which ones did not-economic 
efficiency. 
Chandler's and Williamson's accounts 
of the development of the large multidi-
mensional corporation stress the need of 
top firm managers concerned with mar-
ket defined efficiency somehow to de-
centralize and yet still control large and 
diversified bureaucracies. Marxians 
highlight a different aspect of the or-
ganizational forms that evolved-that 
they sharply reduced the importance of 
workers with special skills, and hence 
shifted power toward capital. Neil Flig-
stein (1990) presents a still different 
view on corporate fitness, which empha-
sizes responsiveness to changed legal re-
gimes, public policies, and the climate of 
political opinion more generally toward 
what corporate action and form ought 
to be. 
As with the case of technology, some 
recent writing has proposed that the 
path that has taken us to the modern 
large hierarchically organized corpora-
tion is one we did not have to take, and 
that in fact better paths existed. We will 
pick up this theme later. 
D.Law 
The final example treated in this sec-
tion is the body of theory that proposes 
that the law evolves. Donald Elliot 
(1985) has written a rich survey of the 
various evolutionary theories about law. I 
focus here on only a small portion of that 
intellectual tradition. 
In particular I will be concerned with 
the body of theorizing, put forth by 
scholars such as Harold Demsetz (1967) 
and William Landes and Richard Posner 
(1987), that the common law evolves in 
directions that make it economically effi-
cient. While different authors in this tra-
dition have proposed different mecha-
nisms, in all the decisions to litigate 
provide the force that gets the law to 
change. In some versions it is argued 
that litigation is more prevalent when 
the law is "inefficient" than when it is 
efficient, because in the latter cases con-
flicts are more likely to be settled out of 
court without any change in the law, al-
though the reasoning behind that propo-
sition is not clear in all accounts. In 
some versions judges (juries) are in-
clined to decide cases that do arise in 
ways that are consistent with economic 
efficiency, and those judgments in turn 
modify the common law in that direc-
tion. In other versions no such inclina-
tion is assumed, but rather cases will 
continue to be litigated until an "effi-
cient" judgment is made, at which time it 
will become precedent and litigation will 
diminish. 
Criticizing this simple view of legal 
evolution, Robert Cooter and Daniel 
Rubenfeld (1989) emphasize the com-
plex nature of legal disputes and their 
settlement, involving the actions ind-
viduals take that may risk suit, decisions 
of potential plaintiffs to assert a legal 
complaint, bargaining regarding out-of-
court settlements, and the proceedings 
of cases that actually get decided in 
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court. They express skepticism about 
whether there are any strong forces lead-
ing to efficiency, and argue that, if there 
are any such strong forces, they must be 
due to the inclinations of judges. They 
are skeptical of this too, citing other le-
gal values-like fairness-and also point-
ing to the fact that judges may have their 
own interests. 
P. Ruben and M. Bailey (1992) re-
cently have proposed an interesting vari-
ant on this theme . They note that law-
yers have a strong financial interest in 
the shape of the law, and in particular 
benefit when the law forces litigation. 
They go on to propose that the recent 
shift of legal precedent toward more fa-
vorable reception of consumer suits re-
garding products which cause them harm 
is, largely, the self-motivated work of 
lawyers. 
0 0 0 
Note that the theories discussed above 
are similar in certain respects, but differ 
in others. They are similar in that they 
all are concerned with a particular aspect 
of culture, and focus on its evolution. 
They are similar in proposing that the 
processes that generate new cultural ele-
ments or modify old ones are to some 
extent blind, although the details of 
these mechanisms differ from case to 
case, and in some the mutation or inno-
vation mechanisms have strongly di-
rected elements as well as random. How-
ever in each of these theories the 
"selection mechanism" provides a large 
share of the explanatory power. That is, 
the power of these theories depends on 
their ability to specify "fitness" plausibly. 
Both neoclassical economists and 
economists inclined to evolutionary theo-
rizing are prone to look to a market or a 
market analogue as the mechanism 
which defines what will "sell, n and to 
"profit" or its analogue as the reward to 
actors that meet the market test. The 
theories above clearly differ in the extent 
to which they can be forced into that 
mold. 
There certainly is no real "market" out 
there in Campbell's or Kuhn's or Laka-
tos' theory of science as an evolutionary 
process, save for the metaphorical "mar-
ket of scientific judgment." In the cases 
of technology and the organization of en-
terprises, a moderately persuasive case 
can be made that, in many sectors at 
least, real, not metaphorical, markets 
have a powerful influence on what is 
"fit" and what is not, and that profit is an 
important measure of fitness. However, 
as we have seen there are dissentors, 
mainly from outside economics. One im-
portant issue is the extent to which com-
petition provides a sharp fitness test in 
sectors where markets are operative. If it 
does not there is room for a variety of 
nonmarket forces to influence what "sur-
vives." Also, there are serious questions 
about the range of sectors-kinds of 
technologies and organizations-where 
markets are strongly operative. In the 
case of military or medical technologies, 
or military bases or hospitals, it can be 
argued that market forces are weak, and 
that the "selection environment" is de-
termined largely by professional judg-
ments, and by political processes that 
regulate how much professionals in the 
sector have to spend. The analytic prob-
lem, then, is to identify how these forces 
define "fitness." 
The dispute about what determines 
how the law evolves highlights these 
kinds of questions. Clearly there is no 
real "market" out there, but one set of 
authors argues that market valuation of 
prevailing law and its alternatives does 
influence what the law becomes, and 
strongly. Other authors are not so sure 
that "efficiency" in an economic sense 
guides the evolution of the law so much 
as ideology, or "interests," or "power." 
One could take a position that it de-
pends, with sometimes one influence 
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prevailing, and sometimes another. How-
ever, in the absence of ability to explain 
or predict what influence will dominate 
in particular cases, while evolutionary 
theory may provide a useful language for 
historical discussion, the theory has little 
predictive power, and its explanations 
are at least partially ad hoc. 
This would seem to be a big strike 
against an evolutionary theory of the law, 
or at least one that is this complex. On 
the other hand one can argue that the 
illumination of the complex contingent 
dependent process by which the law 
evolves is a strength of the theory. Such 
an analysis reveals the apparent strong 
predictive power of a simpler theory-in 
this case that the law always adjusts so 
that it is maximally efficient-to be fool's 
gold. I take it that this is Gould's argu-
ment against the proposition that evolu-
tion optimizes biological fitness. 
However, this kind of understanding 
of complexity that a good and well-posed 
evolutionary theory may yield needs to 
be distinguished sharply from weak-
nesses in prediction and explanation that 
stem from the fact that a theory is not 
coherent. Thus the argument that the 
law evolves so as to be efficient, for ex-
ample, is an assertion that may or may 
not be empirically correct, but which 
originally was presented with no coher-
ent evolutionary theory behind it. The 
proposition that litigation stops if and 
only if the law is efficient may provide 
part of an evolutionary theoretic basis 
for such an analytic argument, but that 
proposition needs more justification than 
it often is given, and the general argu-
ment almost surely needs some other as-
sumptions as well. 
In my judgment virtually all of the 
theories described in this section could 
benefit from a closer scrutiny and more 
careful development of their logical 
structure. I deliberately have not tied 
the term «formal theory" to the expres-
sion of a theory in mathematical or 
quasi-mathematical terms. Particularly if 
the logic is relatively simple, expression 
in careful natural language can be rigor-
ous. But when the logic becomes com-
plex, the advantages of mathematical for-
mulation can be substantial. 
Once one is confident that the theory 
put forth is logically coherent, the cen-
tral question remains as to whether one 
finds the theory plausible, given what 
one knows about the facts of the matter. 
But evolutionary theories are no differ-
ent in this regard than any other kind. 
IV. Evolutionary Models of Economic 
Growth Fuelled by Technical Advance 
The body of evolutionary theorizing 
considered in this section differs from 
that discussed above in at least three re-
spects. First, the theorizing is more com-
plex in the sense that it involves a num-
ber of different variables, and the focus 
is on their coevolution. Second, the the-
ory is expressed mathematically; in some 
cases the logical connections are devel-
oped as theorems, while in others they 
are explored through simulation meth-
ods. 
Third, the evolutionary theories pre-
sented here have been put forth by their 
authors as express alternatives to another 
theory-in this case neoclassical growth 
theory-which they regard as too "me-
chanical." In this sense they represent a 
deliberate attempt on the part of the 
authors to move toward Marshall's 
Mecca. 
While concerned with economic dy-
namics, the kind of analysis contained in 
neoclassical growth theory almost cer-
tainly was among the kind Marshall had 
in mind when he referred to theories 
based on mechanical concepts of equilib-
rium. Within that theory, economic 
growth is viewed .as the moving equilib-
rium of a market economy, in which 
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technical advance is continuously in-
creasing the productivity of inputs, and 
the capital stock growing relative to la-
bor inputs. These two phenomena to-
gether provide the explanation for the 
increase in labor productivity and per 
capita income that are the standard 
measures of growth. Together, in the 
way the theory is put together, they ex-
plain the rise in real wages that has char-
acterized economic growth. 
Technical advance is an essential ele-
ment of the neoclassical account. The 
last few years have seen a number of in-
teresting proposals to amend the simple 
neoclassical growth model so as to high-
light that technical advance is to a con-
siderable degree endogenous. (For re-
views see Paul Romer 1991 and Bart 
Verspagen 1992.) However these "new" 
neoclassical models are "mechanical" in 
the same sense as are the old ones. They 
do not address the problems with neo-
classical growth theory felt by the 
authors of evolutionary alternatives. 
In particular, as we have noted, virtu-
ally all serious scholars of technical ad-
vance have stressed the uncertainty, the 
differences of opinion among experts, 
the surprises, that mark the process. Me-
chanical analogies involving a moving 
equilibrium in which . the actors always 
behave "as if' they knew what they were 
doing seem quite inappropriate. Most 
knowledgeable scholars agree with Vin-
centi that the process must be under-
stood as an evolutionary one. The chal-
lenge faced by the authors considered in 
this section has been to devise a theory 
of growth in which technical advance 
and capital formation together drive 
growth, as in neoclassical growth theory, 
and which is capable of explaining the 
observed macroeconomic patterns, but 
on the basis of an evolutionary theory of 
technical change rather than one that 
presumes continuing equilibrium. 
Without any exception I know about, 
the evolutionary theories of economic 
growth that have been developed all 
draw inspiration from Joseph Schumpe-
ter's Capitalism., Socialism and Democ-
racy ( 1976, first published 1942). In that 
work, Schumpeter developed a theory of 
endogenous technological advance, re-
sulting from the investments made by 
business firms to best or stay up with 
their rivals. The earliest class of formal 
evolutionary growth models based on 
these ideas was developed by Winter and 
myself (1974), and because it has pro-
vided much of the base for subsequent 
work, I shall concentrate on it. However 
I also will consider variants or extensions 
that have been developed by others. 
In these models, firms are the key ac-
tors, not individual human beings. Of 
course (implicitly) firms must provide 
sufficient inducements to attract and 
hold the individuals that staff them. But 
within these models, individuals are 
viewed as interchangeable and their ac-
tions determined by the firms they are 
in. 
In turn, the firms in these models are, 
from one point of view, the entities that 
are more or less fit, in this case more or 
less profitable. But from another point of 
view firms can be regarded as merely the 
incubators and carriers of "technologies" 
and other practices that determine "what 
they do" and "how productively" in par-
ticular circumstances. Winter and I have 
used the term "routines" to denote 
these. The concept of routines is analyti-
cally similar to the genes in biological 
theory, or the memes or culturgens in 
sociobiology. 
The term "routine" connotes, deliber-
ately, behavior that is conducted without 
much explicit thinking about it, as habits 
or customs. On the other hand, within 
these models routines can be understood 
as the behaviors deemed appropriate and 
effective in the settings where they are 
invoked. Indeed they are the product of 
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processes that involve profit-oriented 
learning and selection . Metaphorically, 
the routines employed by a firm at any 
time can be regarded as the best it 
"knows and can do." To employ them is 
rational in that sense, even though the 
firm did not go through any attempt to 
compare its prevailing routines with all 
possible alternative ones. Whether that 
translates into "optimizing" behavior de-
pends on what one means by that term. 
(For a fine discussion of this issue in bi-
ology and in economics, see Paul Schoe-
maker 1991. ) 
These models generally involve three 
different kinds of firm "routines ." First, 
there are those that might be called 
"standard operating procedures," those 
that determine how and how much a 
firm produces under various circum-
stances, given its capital stock and other 
constraints on its actions that are fixed in 
the short run. Prominent among these 
are technologies. Second, there are rou-
tines that determine the investment be-
havior of the firm, the equations that 
govern its growth or decline (measured 
in terms of its capital stock) as a fonction 
of its profits, and perhaps other vari-
ables . Third, the deliberative processes 
of the firm , those that involve searching 
for better ways of doing things, also are 
viewed as guided by routines . While in 
principle within these models search be-
havior could be focused ·on any one of 
the firms prevailing routines-its tech-
nologies, or other standard operating 
procedures, its investment rule, or even 
its prevailing search procedures-in 
practice, in all of them search is assumed 
to be oriented to uncover new produc-
tion techniques or to improve prevailing 
ones. Winter and I have found it conven-
ient to call such search R & D. Other 
authors of similar models have invoked 
the term "learning" to describe analo-
gous "improvement" processes. 
Firm search processes provide the 
source of differential fitness; firms 
whose R & D turn up better technolo-
gies will earn profits and grow relative to 
their competitors . But R & D also tends 
to bind firms together as a community 
because in these models a firm's R & D 
partly attends to what its competitors are 
doing, and profitable innovations are, 
with a lag, imitated by other firms in the 
industry. 
The firm, or rather the collection of 
firms in the industry, perhaps involving 
new firms coming into the industry and 
old ones exiting, is viewed as operating 
within an exogenously determined envi-
ronment. The profitability of any firm is 
determined by what it is doing, and what 
its competitors do, given the environ-
ment. Generally the environment can be 
interpreted as a "market," or set of mar-
kets. 
Note that in the theory that has been 
sketched above , just as routines are 
analogous to genes, firms are analogous 
to phenotypes, or particular 'organisms, 
in biological evolutionary theory, but 
there are profound differences. First, 
firms do not have a natural life span, and 
not all ultimately die . Neither can they 
be regarded as having a natural size. 
Some may be big, some small . Thus in 
assessing the relative importance of a 
particular routine in the industry mix, or 
analyzing whether it is expanding or con-
tracting in relative use, it is not sufficient 
to "count" the firms employing it . One 
must consider their size, or whether they 
are growing or contracting. Second, un-
like phenotypes (living organisms) that 
are stuck with their genes, firms are not 
stuck with their routines . Indeed they 
have built in mechanisms for changing 
them. 
The logic of these models defines a dy-
namic stochastic system. It can be mod-
eled as a complex Markov process. A 
standard iteration can be described as 
follows. At the existing moment of time 
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all firms can be characterized by their 
capital stocks and prevailing routines. 
Decision rules keyed to market condi-
tions look to those conditions' "last pe-
riod." Inputs employed and outputs 
produced by all firms then are deter-
mined. The market then determines 
prices . Given the technology and other 
routines used by each firm, each firm's 
profitability _then is determined, and 
the investment rule then determines 
how much each firm expands or con-
tracts . Search routines focus on one or 
another aspect of the firm 's behavior 
and capabilities, and (stochastically) 
come up with proposed modifications 
which may or may not be adopted. The 
system is now ready for next period's it-
eration. 
The theory described above can be 
evaluated on a number of counts . One is 
whether the view of behavior it contains, 
in abstract form, is appealing given what 
it purports to analyze . The individuals 
and organizations in these models act , as 
humans do in the models of sociobiology, 
on the basis of habits or customs or be-
liefs; in the Nelson-Winter model all 
these define routines . While firm rou-
tines can be regarded as the result of a 
learning process , the implicit "rational-
ity" in these models certainly is a 
"bounded" one, in the sense of Simon 
(1947) and James March and Simon 
(1958). As we shall see, it is quite possi-
ble to build a certain amount of foresight 
into the actors of an evolutionary theory. 
However if one wants a model in which 
it is presumed that the actors largely un-
derstand the details of the context in 
which they are operating and competing, 
save for the truly stochastic elements, 
and are able to choose their best action 
in the light of this full knowledge, one 
might as well use a full-blown neoclassi-
cal rational choice model. This of course 
is what is done in the new neoclassical 
growth theories. 
The theory can be judged by the ap-
peal of the theory of technical progress 
built into it. The view is certainly "evolu-
tionary," and in that regard squares well 
with the accounts given by scholars of 
technical advance like Vincenti, at least 
in abstract forms . It must be noted that, 
within the theory, "evolution" is going on 
at several different levels . New techno-
logical departures are being generated 
by individual firms, which in effect "se-
lect'' on them deciding which to intro-
duce and which not to . (For an empirical 
study of evolution within a firm see 
Robert Burgelmam 1993.) Firms also 
are, by scanning their competitors' tech-
nologies, deciding which of these to take 
aboard and which not . In addition, there 
is market selection on firms that are do-
ing well. 
Within this class of models, "profit-
ability" determines the "fitness" of tech-
nology, and of firms, and firms are the 
only organizational actors . These obser-
vations call attention to the fact that 
this theory would seem to apply only to 
economic sectors where the market 
provides the (or the dominant) selec-
tion mechanism winnowing on technolo-
gies and firms. It is not well suited for 
dealing with sectors like medical care, 
or defense, where professional judg-
ments, or political process, determine 
what is fit and what is not. Selection en-
vironments clearly differ from sector to 
sector, and it would seem that these dif-
ferences need to be understood and built 
into sectoral level analyses . (For an 
elaboration of this point, see Nelson and 
Winter 1977.) 
However the central purpose of the 
models considered in this section is to 
explain economic growth at a macro-
economic level. Thus a fundamental 
question about them is this. Can they 
generate, hence in a sense explain; the 
rising output per worker, growing capital 
intensity, rising real wages, and a rela-
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tively constant rate of return on capital, 
that have been the standard pattern in 
advanced industrial nations and what 
neoclassical growth theory seems to ex-
plain? The answer is that they can, and 
in ways that conform well with underly-
ing appreciative theory. 
Within these models a successful tech-
nological innovation generates profits for 
the firm making it, and leads to capital 
formation and growth of the firm . Firm 
growth generally is sufficient to out-
weigh any decline in employment per 
unit of output associated with productiv-
ity growth, and hence results in an in-
crease in the demand for labor, which 
pulls up the real wage rate. This latter 
consequence means that capital using 
but labor saving innovations now become 
more profitable, and when by chance 
they appear as a result of a "search," 
they will be adopted, thus pulling up 
the level of capital intensity in the econ-
omy. At the same time that labor produc-
tivity, real wages, and capital intensity 
are rising, the same mechanisms hold 
down the rate of return on capital. If the 
profit rate rises, say because of the crea-
tion of especially productive new tech-
nology, the high profits will induce an in-
vestment boom, which will pull up 
wages, and drive capital returns back 
down. 
These deductions of evolutionary 
growth theory would not surprise an ad-
vocate of neoclassical theory. On the sur-
face they appear similar to those of neo-
classical growth theory. Indeed for 
evolutionary theory to have credibility 
these predictions had better be similar, 
because any broad growth theory needs 
to be consistent with the basic empiri-
cally documented broad features of eco-
nomic growth as we have experienced it. 
However, while at first glance the mech-
anisms explaining these patterns have 
a certain surface similarity in evolution-
ary and neoclassical theory, if one looks 
beneath the surface one can see that 
the mechanisms in fact are very differ-
ent. In particular, one theory is based on 
the "conception" of a moving equilib-
rium, and the other most emphatically is 
not. 
And if one takes a closer look, it be-
comes clear that evolutionary theory en-
ables one to see, to expect, phenomena 
to which neoclassical theory is blind, or 
denies . At the same time that the model 
generates "macro" time series that re-
semble the actual data, beneath the ag-
gregate at any time there is considerable 
variation among firms in the technolo-
gies they are using, their productivity, 
and their profitability. Within this model 
more productive and profitable tech-
niques tend to replace less productive 
ones, through two mechanisms. Firms 
using more profitable technologies grow. 
And more profitable technologies tend 
to be imitated and adopted by firms who 
had been using less profitable ones . Thus 
the theory is consistent with both the 
large body of empirical work that has 
documented considerable and persistent 
intra-industry inter-firm dispersion (e.g., 
Richard Rumelt 1991 and Mueller 1989) 
and with what is known empirically 
about the diffusion of new techniques 
(see e.g., Stanley Metcalfe 1988). Neo-
classical growth theories have trouble 
being consistent with these elements of 
economic growth as we have experienced 
it. 
Luc Soete and Roy Turner (1984), 
Metcalfe (1988, 1992), and Metcalfe and 
Michael Gibbons (1989) have developed 
evolutionary growth models focusing on 
diffusion, in the sense above. These 
authors repress the stochastic element in 
the introduction of new technologies 
that was prominent in the models de-
scribed above and, in effect, work with a 
given and fixed set of technologies. How-
ever, within these models each of the in-
dividual technologies may be improving 
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over time, possibly at different rates . At 
the same time, firms are tending to allo-
cate their investment portfolios more 
heavily toward the more profitable tech-
nologies than toward the less. As a re-
sult, rising productivity in the industry as 
a whole, and measured aggregate "tech-
nical advance," is the consequence of 
two different kinds of forces. One is the 
improvement of the individual technolo-
gies . The other is the expansion of use of 
the more productive technologies rela-
tive to the less productive ones . 
Both groups of authors point out that 
the latter phenomenon is likely to be a 
more potent source of productivity 
growth when there is prevailing large 
variation in the productivity of technolo-
gies in wide use, than when the best 
technology already dominates in use. 
Thus the aggregate growth performance 
of the economy is strongly related to the 
prevailing variation beneath the aggre-
gate. 
The model by Gerald Silverberg, Dosi, 
and Luigi Orsenigo (1988) develops the 
basic theoretical notions introduced in 
this section in another direction. In their 
model there are only two technologies. 
One is potentially better than the other, 
but that potential will not be achieved 
unless effort is put into improving pre-
vailing practice. Rather than incorporat-
ing a separate "search" activity, in Silver-
berg et al. a firm improves its prevailing 
procedures (technologies) through learn-
ing associated with operation. What a 
firm learns is reflected in its increased 
productivity in using that technology, but 
some of the learning "leaks out" and en-
ables others using that technology to im-
prove their productivity for free, as it 
were. 
In contrast with the other models con-
sidered in this section where firms do 
not "look forward" to anticipate future 
developments, in the model of Silver-
berg et al., firms, or at least some of 
them, recognize that the technology that 
initially is behind in productivity is po-
tentially the better technology, and also 
that they can gain advantage over their 
competitors if they invest in using and 
learning with it. In contrast with the 
Nelson-Winter model, a firm may em-
ploy some of both technologies, and 
hence may use some of its profits from 
using the prevailing best technology to 
invest in experience with presently infe-
rior technology that is potentially the 
best. If no firm does this, then of course 
the potential of the potentially better 
technology never will be realized. 
An early "innovator" may come out a 
winner, if it learns rapidly, and little of 
its learning "spills out," or its competi-
tors are sluggish in getting into the new 
technology themselves. On the other 
hand, it may come out a loser, if its 
learning is slow and hence the cost of 
operating the new technology remains 
high, or most of its learning "spills out" 
and its competitors get in in a timely 
manner, taking advantage for-free of the 
spillover. . 
Several other evolutionary growth 
models have been developed. Gunnar 
Eliasson and colleagues have been con-
structing over the years a very detailed 
evolutionary model calibrated on the 
Swedish economy. (See Eliasson's chap-
ter in Day and Eliasson 1986.) Francesca 
Chiaramonte and Dosi (1993) recently 
have blended into the Silverberg-Dosi-
Orsenigo model elements of the Nelson-
Winter assumptions about stochastic 
search for new techniques. Katsuhito 
Iwai (1984) and John Conlisk (1989) also 
have published models in this class. 
There clearly is a lot of richness in these 
"Schumpeterian" models of economic 
growth, and I believe a lot of potential. 
It remains to be seen how many econo-
mists studying economic growth using 
the "old" theoretical technology will be 
attracted to gamble on the new. 
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V. Path Dependencies, Dynamic 
Increasing Returns, and the Evolution of 
Industry Structure 
The models considered in Section IV 
go a certain distance toward consistency 
with the appreciative theoretic accounts 
of long run economic change, but there 
still is a lot that is "mechanical" about 
them. Certain variables grow over time, 
in particular output per worker and real 
wages . Others remain more or less con-
stant, like the rate of return on capital 
and factor shares, or at least show no sys-
tematic drift. However by and large 
nothing goes on that could be called "de-
velopment. " While industry may become 
more concentrated over time, there are 
no major changes in industry structure of 
the sort often highlighted in economic 
histories. No radically new technologies 
emerge, no new institutions. 
The evolutionary theories considered 
in this section have more of a develop-
mental flavor. They involve path depen-
dencies , dynamic increasing returns, and 
their intereaction . 
Path dependencies are built into all of 
the models considered above, and dy-
namic increasing returns (which is one 
way path dependency may emerge) into 
some. Thus in virtually all of the models, 
the particular firms that survive in the 
long run are influenced by events, to a 
considerable extent random, that happen 
early in a model's run. To the extent that 
firms specialize in particular kinds of 
technology, what technologies survive is 
influenced similarly by early random 
events. In some of the models, "dynamic 
increasing returns" makes path depen-
dency particularly strong. Thus in Silver-
berg, Dosi, and Orsenigo the more a 
firm uses a technology the better it gets 
at that technology. More, some of the 
learning "spills over" to benefit other 
firms using that particular technology. 
Thus the more a technology is used, 
the better it becomes vis avis its com-
petitors. 
But while path dependencies and dy-
namic increasing returns are built into 
most of the models we already have con-
sidered, this was not the center of atten-
tion of the authors. Over the past few 
years, however, a considerable literature 
in evolutionary economics has grown up 
focused on these topics. The works of 
Brian Arthur (1988, 1989) and Paul 
David (1985, 1992) are particularly inter-
esting. My treatment here will aim to 
generalize the issues they address . 
A. Technology Cycles and Dominant 
Designs 
I begin by considering models that fo-
cus on competition among technologies. 
Students of technical advance long have 
noted that, in the early stages of a tech-
nology's history, there usually are a num-
ber of competing variants . (For a fine 
discussion and a number of illustrative 
case studies see James Utterback 1994.) 
Thus in the early history of automobiles, 
some models were powered by gasoline 
fuelled internal combustion engines, 
some by steam engines, some by batter-
ies. As we know, gradually gasoline fu-
elled engines came to dominate and the 
other two possibilities were abandoned. 
The standard explanation for this is 
that gasoline engines were the superi9r 
mode, and with experience that was 
found out. The Silverberg, Dosi, and 
Orsenigo paper contains a model of this 
mechanism. In their analysis a poten-
tially superior new alternative requires 
some development-learning-before its 
latent superiority becomes manifest. It 
can take time before that development 
occurs and, with bad luck, it even is pos-
sible that it never occurs . But by and 
large the potentially better technology 
will win out. 
In the Arthur and David models, one 
can see a different explanation for why 
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the internal combustion engine won out. 
It need not have been innately superior. 
In these models there are dynamic in-
creasing returns, in that the more a par-
ticular technology is employed, the 
greater its attractiveness relative to its 
competitors. Thus in the case in ques-
tion, all that would have been required 
for the gasoline engine to come to domi-
nate was a run of luck. For some chance 
reason it gained an initial lead, and this 
started a rolling snowball mechanism. 
What might lie behind an increasing 
returns rolling snowball? Arthur, David, 
and other authors suggest several differ-
ent possibilities. 
One is that each of the competing 
technologies involved is what Winter and 
I have called a cumulative technology. In 
a cumulative technology, today's techni-
cal advances build from and improve 
upon the technology that was available at 
the start of the period, and tomorrow's 
in turn builds on today's . The cumulative 
effect is like the technology specific 
learning in the Silverberg et al. model. 
Thus according to the cumulative 
technology theory, in the early history of 
automobiles, gasoline engines, steam en-
gines, and electrical engines, might all 
have been plausible alternative technolo-
gies for powering cars . While we now 
know that gasoline · engines became 
dominant, according to this theory this 
might have been simply a matter of luck. 
By chance inventors tended to concen-
trate on it, or by chance big advances 
were made. However, once the gasoline 
engine had been developed to a point 
where it was significantly superior to ex-
tant steam or electrical engines, invest-
ing time and resources to advance these 
other technologies came to appear a bad 
bet, because such a large gap in perfor-
mance needed to be made up before 
they would be competitive. 
There are two other dynamic increas-
ing returns stories that have been put 
forth. One stresses advantages to con-
sumers or users if different individuals 
buy similar, or compatible products-
this has been called network externali-
ties-which lend advantage to a variant 
that just happens to attract a number of 
customers early. The other stresses com-
plements, for example where a particular 
product has a specialized complementary 
product or service, whose development 
may lend that variant special advantages. 
Telephone networks, in which each user 
is strongly interested in having other us-
ers have compatible products, is the 
most commonly employed example of 
the first case. Video cassette recorders 
which run cassettes that . need to be spe-
cially tailored to their particular design, 
or computers that require compatible 
software, are often used as examples of 
the second. (For a very good general dis-
cussion and review of the literature on 
both of these stories, see Michael Katz 
and Carl Shapiro 1994.) 
However, while the stories are differ-
ent, the mathematics used to formalize 
them tends to be the same. (See e.g., Ar-
thur 1988.) Also, the phenomena often 
are intertwined, and also linked with the 
processes involved in the development of 
cumulative technologies, as in David's 
(1985) example of the QWERTY type-
writer keyboard. 
Thus to return to our automobile ex-
ample, people who learned to drive in 
their parents' or friends' car powered by 
an internal combustion engine almost 
certainly were drawn to similar cars 
when they themselves came to purchase 
one, in part to avoid the new learning 
and potential surprises that would be in-
volved if they bought a steam or electric 
powered one. At the same time the as-
cendancy of automobiles powered by gas 
burning internal combustion engines 
made it profitable for petroleum compa-
nies to locate gasoline stations at conven-
ient places along highways. It also made 
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it profitable for them to search for new 
sources of petroleum, and to develop 
technologies that reduced gasoline pro-
duction costs . In turn, this increased the 
attractiveness of gasoline powered cars 
to car drivers and buyers . 
Note that, for those who consider gas 
engine automobiles, large petroleum 
companies, and the dependence of a 
large share of the nation's transportation 
on petroleum, a complex that lies behind 
many social ills, the story spun out above 
indicates that "it did not have to be this 
way." If the roll of the die early in the 
history of automobiles had come out an-
other way, we might today have had 
steam or electric cars. A similar argu-
ment recently has been made about the 
victory of A.G. over D.C. as the "system" 
for carrying electricity (for an open-
minded discussion see David 1992). The 
story also invites consideration of possi-
bly self-interested professional judg-
ments or political factors as major ele-
ments in the shaping of long run 
economic trends, a subject we will pick 
up shortly. After all, under these theo-
ries all it takes may be just a little push. 
On the other hand, other analysts may 
see the above account as overblown. 
Steam and battery powered car engines 
had major limitations then and still do 
now; gasoline clearly was better. A.C. 
had major advantages over D.C., and still 
does. According to this point of view dy-
namic increasing returns is an important 
phenomenon, but it is unlikely that it has 
greatly influenced which technology won 
out, in most important cases . I predict 
that this issue will be a lively topic of 
empirical research and argument over 
the coming years . 
There also is a more general open 
question about the range of technologies 
where a "dominant design" emerges, for 
any reason. The various dynamic increas-
ing returns stories seem plausible for 
some product classes, but not for others. 
And in some product class areas differ-
ent user needs may tend to prevent a 
particular product from coming to domi-
nate the market, even if there are dy-
namic increasing returns. Pharmaceuti-
cals, the value of which are extremely 
sensitive to both the particular disease 
and the particular characteristics of the 
patient, are a good case in point. 
B. Firm and Industry Structure 
I turn now to a different but related 
body of evolutionary writings-that con-
cerned with the evolution of industry 
structure as a technology develops . It is 
tied to the notion that in most technolo-
gies after a period of time a dominant 
design emerges, but is not committed to 
any particular theory of how that hap-
pens, whether because the truly better 
variant is finally found and consensus de-
velops around it or because of dynamic 
increasing returns phenomena. In any 
case, within this body of evolutionary 
theorizing, the establishment of a domi-
nant design has important implications 
regarding the subsequent nature of R & 
D, and for industry structure. 
The basic argument would appear to 
have two sources . The first is Mueller 
and Tilton (1969), based on their specu-
lations about patterns of industry evolu-
tion they were observing. The second 
was William Abernathy and Utterback 
(1975) based on their detailed study of 
automobiles. Because the Abernathy and 
Utterback story is closely linked to an in-
teresting theory of what happens to R & 
D as a dominant design emerges, I will 
follow it. 
The basic proposition is that, prior to 
the emergence of a dominant design, 
there is little R & D directed toward im-
proving production processes, because 
product designs are unstable, and the 
market for any one is small. With the 
emergence of a dominant design, the 
profits from developing better ways of 
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producing it become considerable. Often 
the development of better production 
processes will involve the exploitation of 
latent scale economies, and the estab-
lishment of capital intensive modes of 
production . In turn, the improvement 
of production processes that are specific 
to a particular broad design further locks 
it in , and disadvantages competing de-
signs. 
The argument then is that this pattern 
of technological evolution causes a par-
ticular pattern of evolution of firm and 
industry structure. In the early stages 
of an industry-say automobiles-firms 
tend to be small, and entry relatively 
easy, reflecting the diversity of technolo-
gies being employed, and their rapid 
change. The industry consists of a num-
ber of smallish firms , but with a lot of 
entry and exit. As the quality of the 
products improve, and the market grows, 
so do the number of firms active in the 
industry. However, as a dominant design 
emerges, and specialized production pro-
cesses are developed, barriers to entry 
begin to rise as the scale and capital 
needed for competitive production 
grows. Also, with the basic technology 
set, learning becomes cumulative, and 
incumbent firms are advantaged relative 
to potential entrants for that reason as 
well. After a shake out, industry struc-
ture settles down to a collection of estab-
lished largish firms. 
When this theory was first put forth, 
there was only limited data supporting 
it . Since that time Michael Gort and 
Steven Klepper (1982), Klepper and 
Elizabeth Graddy (1990), Utterback and 
Fernando Suarez (1993), Utterback 
(1994), and Franco Malerba and 
Orsenigo (1993, 1994) have provided 
convincing evidence that this pattern of 
evolution in fact holds over a wide range 
of industries. 
A recent formal model developed by 
Klepper (1993) accepts the broad em-
pirical story, but puts forth a different 
evolutionary theory to explain it. In 
Klepper's model the investments made 
by a firm in product innovation are inde-
pendent of firm size, but investments in 
process innovation are positively related 
to firm size. As in the more standard 
story, in the early days of a technology's 
history, firms are small, for that reason 
little process R & D is done, and entry 
barriers are low. The presence of many 
firms makes for rapid product innova-
tion. But as profitable extant firms grow 
and invest more in process innovation, 
entry barriers rise. Shake out occurs be-
cause of rivalry among the extant firms , 
increasingly competing on the basis of 
cost. No dominant design emerges in the 
Klepper model, but as the number of ex-
tant firms dwindles, product innovation 
slows. 
C. Supporting Institutions 
The writing on the roevolution of 
technology and industry structure tends 
to define industry structure rather con-
ventionally. However, there are a num-
ber of studies which define industry 
structure more broadly, or look outside 
the industry, narrowly defined, and are 
concerned with the coevolution of a 
technology and industry with various 
supporting institutions. 
As an industry becomes established, 
one frequently observes not only the de-
velopment of technical and product stan-
dards, but also the emergence of stan-
dard patterns of interaction more 
generally between firms, suppliers, and 
customers, and across firms in the indus-
try. Economic relations become embed-
ded in social ones, along the lines de-
scribed by Mark Granovetter (1985), and 
people become conscious that there is a 
new industry, and that it has collective 
interests and needs. Michael Hannan 
and Glenn Carroll discuss in some detail 
these processes of "legitimation" and 
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their consequences. See also Bennett 
Harrison (1992). Industry or trade asso-
ciations form. These give the industry a 
recognized organization that can lobby 
on its behalf for regulation to its liking, 
for protection from competition from 
outside the group, for public programs to 
support it, etc. This is another feature of 
an industry's evolution that can lock in 
the status quo. 
More generally, while the formal evo-
lutionary growth models of Section IV, 
and the dynamic increasing returns mod-
els discussed at the beginning of this sec-
tion, take the basic parameters of the 
"selection environment" (usually treated 
as a market) as given, many of the soci-
ologists studying industry evolution 
stress that the industry itself strongly 
molds its own selection environment. It 
does so through the rules of behavior 
and interaction among firms that evolve 
spontaneously, through the formation of 
a variety of industry-related organiza-
tions that decide matters like standards, 
and through political action. (See e.g., 
Michael Tushman and Elaine Romanelli 
1985; and Rosenkopf and Tushman 
1994.) In turn such action may be central 
in determining what design or system 
turns out to be dominant. (For such a 
discussion bearing on electric power sys-
tems, see Patrick McGuire, Granovetter, 
and Michael Schwartz 1993.) 
If the technology on which the indus-
try is based has novel characteristics, 
new technical societies and new techni-
cal journals, tend to spring up. In some 
cases whole new fields of "science" may 
come into being (Rosenberg 1982, ch. 7; 
and Nelson and Rosenberg 1993). Thus 
the field of metallurgy came into exist-
ence because of a demand for better un-
derstanding of the factors that deter-
mined the properties of steel. Computer 
science was brought into existence by 
the advent of the modern computer. 
Chemical engineering and electrical en-
gineering rose up as fields of teaching 
and research because of industry de-
mand for them that occurred after the 
key technological advances that launched 
the industries. Earlier I noted the appar-
ent blindness of much of the writing on 
how science evolves to the use of science 
in technology. The technology-oriented 
sciences directly provide a "market like" 
environment stimulating research on 
various topics and also a stringent test 
environment for new scientific theories 
and other published findings. 
The emergence and development of 
these technology-oriented sciences tend 
to tie industries to universities, which 
provide both people trained in the rele-
vant fields, and research findings which 
enable the technology to advance fur-
ther. The development of these sciences 
naturally lends extra strength to prevail-
ing technologies. On the other hand the 
presence of university research tends to 
dilute the extent to which firms in being 
have knowledge advantages over poten-
tial entrants. Also, research at universi-
ties just may become the source of radi-
cally different technological alternatives. 
Recognition of the role of technical so-
cieties and universities in the develop-
ment of modern technologies opens the 
door to seeing the wide range of institu-
tions that may co-evolve with a technol-
ogy and an industry. Often legal struc-
tures need to change. Thus there may be 
intellectual property rights issues that 
need to be sorted out-bio-technology is 
a striking contemporary case in point. 
There almost always are issues of regu-
lation, as was prominently the case in 
radio and, in a different manner, bio-
technology again. Hughes (1983) has 
described in great detail the wide range 
of legal and regulatory matters that had 
to be decided before electric power 
could go forward strongly, and how the 
particular ways they were decided af-
fected the evolution of the technology 
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and the industry. The coevolution of law 
and technology and industry structure 
has been only lightly touched in the writ-
ings on how the law evolves. 
In many cases new public sector activi-
ties and programs are required. Thus 
mass use of automobiles required that 
societies organize themselves to build 
and maintain a system of public roads. 
Airplanes required airports. The devel-
opment of radio, and of commercial tele-
vision, required mechanisms to allocate 
the radio spectrum. 
These examples indicate that the evo-
lution of institutions relevant to a tech-
nology or industry may be a very com-
plex process involving not only the 
actions of private firms competing with 
each other in a market environment, but 
also organizations like industry associa-
tions, technical societies, universities, 
courts, government agencies, legisla-
tures, etc. In tum, the way these other 
organizations evolve and the things they 
do may profoundly influence the nature 
of the firms and the organization of in-
dustry. Thus Michael Piore and Charles 
Sabel (1984) have proposed that the or-
ganization of manufacturing activity 
through large vertically integrated firms, 
which came to be the norm in many U.S. 
industries in the early decades of the 
twentieth century, was not inevitable, 
but was drawn by the broader institu-
tional context of the U.S. We might in-
stead have organized production in many 
of these industries through a more fluid 
structure of networked small and me-
dium-sized firms. (See also Sabel and 
Jonathan Zeitlin 1993.) In the view of 
these authors, the U.S. might be in bet-
ter shape now had the latter been the 
case. 
VI. Responding to the Winds of Change 
Evolutionary theory in biology pro-
vides a sharp answer to the question of 
how life responds in situations where 
major environmental changes make exist-
ing dominant life forms ill adapted. To 
the extent that better adapted life forms 
are present in at least small numbers, 
these and their similar offspring will 
thrive and multiply, and their now poorly 
adapted peers will tend to die out. Some 
new varieties created through mating or 
mutation that would have had no chance 
in the old regime, may do well in the 
new one. Others that would have pros-
pered now may have no chance. 
How is it in economics? If one consid-
ers "firms" or other organizations as car-
riers of basic practices-earlier I called 
them routines-what happens when the 
market or something else changes? A 
fundamental difference between organi-
zations and organisms, of course, is that 
the former are not stuck with their rou-
tines but can change them, while the lat-
ter cannot change their genes. Thus, 
unlike the case in biology, it is meaning-
ful in economic evolutionary theory to 
ask about the extent to which significant 
adjustment to changed environmental 
conditions-for example a sharp change 
in patterns of consumer demands, or fac-
tor availabilities and prices, or the ad-
vent of radically new technology-is 
achieved largely by old organizations 
learning new ways, or requires the death 
of old organizations, and the birth of new 
ones. 
Some of the organizational ecology 
models developed by sociologists take a 
position that firms are like biological or-
ganisms. Thus Michael Hannan and John 
Freeman (1989) posit (for the purposes 
of their formal theorizing) that organiza-
tions cannot change their ways at all. U o-
der this view society's ability to respond 
to change depends entirely on the pres-
ence at any time of a variety of organiza-
tions, or the generation of new ones. 
(For more eclectic surveys of sociologi-
cal approaches to the evolution of or-
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ganizations, see Howard Aldrich 1979; 
W. Richard Scott 1992; and Joel Baum 
and Jitendra Singh 1994.) 
While this position may sound bizarre 
to many economists, a number of careful 
students of firm behavior have been im-
pressed that the set of things a firm can 
do well at any time is quite limited, and 
that, while firms certainly can learn to do 
new things, · these learning capabilities 
also are limited. Thus Mueller (1989), 
Karel Cool and Dan Schendel (1988), 
and Rumelt (1991) have shown that, 
within an industry, there tends to be per-
sistent differences across firms in profit-
ability or productivity. While "imitation" 
is an important economic phenomenon, 
there would appear to be durable firm 
differences, associated with unique re-
sources or competences. Dosi, David 
Teece, and Winter (1992) have devel-
oped an argument that, to be effective, a 
firm needs a package of routines, includ-
ing those concerned with learning and 
innovation , that are "coherent." But that 
coherency, on the other hand, entails a 
certain rigidity. 
Paul Milgrom and John Roberts 
(1990), commenting on a wide range of 
recent literature on firm competences, 
have stressed that competences tend to 
come in strongly complementary pack-
ages of traits. As Daniel Levinthal (1994) 
argues , this undoubtedly is an important 
reason that successful firms often are 
difficult to imitate effectively, because 
to do so requires that a competitor adopt 
a number of different practices at 
once. It also is an important reason why 
firms who do well in one context may 
have great difficulty in adapting to a new 
one. 
Winter and I (1977, 1982) and Dosi 
(1982, 1988) have used the concept of 
technological regime or paradigm to re-
fer to the set of understandings about a 
particular broad technology that are 
shared by experts in a field, including 
understandings about what a firm needs 
to be doing to operate effectively in that 
regime. Tushman and Anderson (1986) 
have coined the term "competence de-
stroying technical advance" to charac-
terize new technologies when the skills 
and understandings needed to deal with 
them are significantly different from 
those relevant to the old. There is now 
considerable evidence (see e.g., Tush-
man and Anderson 1986; Utterback 
1994; Clayton Christensen and Richard 
Rosenbloom, forthcoming; Rebecca 
Henderson and Kim Clark 1990; and 
Henderson 1993) that when such a new 
technology comes along, the old entry 
barriers fall down, new companies enter, 
and many old ones fail. Thus or-
ganizations may be more like organisms 
than many economists are wont to be-
lieve, and significant economic change 
like significant biological change may in-
volve large elements of creative destruc-
tion. 
What about the institutions that sup-
port a particular industry or technology? 
Can the old ones change to meet the 
changed needs, or must a basically new 
set come into existence? If the latter is 
the case, does this tend to involve the 
ascendancy of new regions or nations , 
and the decline of the old? William La-
zonick (1990) among others has argued 
that the broad organization of work and 
institutions for training labor that 
worked so well for British industry in the 
late nineteenth century became a handi -
cap in the twentieth. Thornstein Veb-
len's famous essay (1915) on the rise of 
Germany as an economic power stresses 
more generally that British industry was 
sorely handicapped in adopting the new 
technologies that were coming into place 
around the turn of the century by an in-
terlocking set of constraints associated 
with her institutions and past invest-
ments , whereas Germany could work 
with a relatively clean slate. 
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Recently these ideas have been revis-
ited by Carlotta Perez (1983) and C. 
Freeman (1991), who have developed 
the concept of a "techno-economic para-
digm." Their argument starts along lines 
developed by Schumpeter many years 
ago: different eras are dominated by dif-
ferent fundamental technologies. They 
then propose that to be effective with 
those technologies a nation requires a set 
of institutions compatible with and sup-
portive of them. The ones suitable for an 
earlier set of fundamental technologies 
may be quite inappropriate for the new. 
Perez and Freeman propose that the pe-
riod since 1970 has seen the rise of "in-
formation technologies" as the new basis 
of economic effectiveness, and argue 
that effective accommodation requires a 
very different set of institutions than 
those required in the earlier era. Japan 
they see as coming closest to having 
them. Other but related explanations of 
the rise of Japan, and the decline of the 
U.S., but focusing on characteristics of 
Japanese firms, and their determinants, 
have been put forth by Masahiko Aoki 
(1990) and Ronald Gilson and Mark Roe 
(1993). The Piore and Sabel (1984) argu-
ment about the institutional. forces that 
led to the particular structuring of 
American firms is about the other side of 
this story. 
Over the last several decades a num-
ber of biological evolutionary theorists 
have proposed that in biology evolution 
often follows the pattern of "punctuated 
equilibrium." Periodically there are 
bursts of mutations that somehow take 
hold, and a new species emerges. There 
follows a period during which the spe-
cies evolve rapidly into a form that, then, 
seems to stabilize. Then in some cases, a 
new species emerges that replaces the 
old. The foregoing analysis suggests that, 
like species, the pattern of evolution of 
technology linked institutional forms 
often is that of punctuated equilibrium. 
VII. Economic Institutions and Their 
Evolution 
Two somewhat different intellectual 
streams have fed into the renewed inter-
est economists have taken in institutions. 
Economists long have looked to differ-
ences across nations in their basic insti-
tutions as an explan~tion for differences 
in · economic performance and living 
standards (see Hodgson 1988, for a fine 
review of the "old" institutional econom-
ics), and in recent years that interest has 
intensified. For the most part until re-
cently research along these lines has 
been empirical, with the theorizing ap-
preciative. Recently that empirically mo-
tivated theorizing has become more for-
mal. Also, over the past fifteen years or 
so, game theorists have come to be inter-
ested in "institutions," associating them 
theoretically with a particular solution of 
games that have multiple Nash equili-
bria. That is, the pattern of behavior as-
sociated with an equilibrium is seen as 
"institutionalized." In turn, this intellec-
tual development has had a strong influ-
ence on the empirically oriented theoriz-
ing. 
One issue that has plagued both old 
and new research on institutions and 
their evolution has been how to define 
institutions. The term has been used to 
cover a grab bag of varied things. Some 
writers, particularly the older generation 
of institutional economists, have used 
the term to refer to what the theorists of 
cultural evolution, discussed above, 
would call "culture," or more specifically 
to those aspects of culture that affect hu-
man and organizational action. Under 
this perspective institutions refer to the 
complex of socially learned and shared 
values, norms, beliefs, meanings, sym-
bols, customs, and standards that .deline-
ate the range of expected and accepted 
behavior in a particular context. This 
view of institutions is alive and well in 
Nelson: Theorizing About Economic Change 81 
modern sociology. (See in particular 
Walter Powell and Paul Di Maggio 
1991.) 
The "new" economic institutionalists 
have a different intellectual starting 
place, and as noted above have borrowed 
extensively from game theory. Thus 
Douglass North (1990) has proposed that 
institutions are "the rules of the game." 
(See also Thrainn Eggerston 1990.) The 
argument then is that, given the motiva-
tions of individuals and organizations 
and technological or other constraints, 
"the rules of the game" determine how 
and why it is played as it is. Andrew 
Schotter (1981), recognizing that games 
may have multiple equilibria, has sug-
gested that institutions define "How the 
game is played" (see also Robert Sugden 
1989). Thus the concept here includes 
not only the rules, but also the standard 
and expected patterns of actual play that 
have evolved, which define the con-
straints and expectations of the present 
players. It is this concept of institutions 
that has become prevalent in evolution-
ary game theory. , While developed in a 
different way, the game theoretic view of 
institutions has much in common with 
the sociological. What is different is the 
stress by sociologists on norms and belief 
systems rationalizing action in a given 
context, whereas the emphasis in game 
theory is on the self-enforcing nature of 
institutionalized behavior. It should be 
noted that North is very close to the so-
ciologists here. 
On the other hand, most historical ac-
counts of institutions refer to more con-
crete things: the form of the modern cor-
poration, or the modern research 
university, the financial system, and the 
particular kind of money in use, the 
court system, a nation's basic legal code, 
etc. Alessandra Casella and Bruno Frey 
(1992) use the term "institution" to refer 
to particular structures and bodies of law 
like GA TT, which define a kind of public 
order. How do these two apparently dif-
ferent notions about institutions relate? 
It is not totally clear, but North makes 
a distinction between what prevailing in-
stitutions in his broad sense allow or re-
quire, and particular realizations within 
the set of the institutionally possible. 
Thus I understand him as taking a posi-
tion akin to Durham's regarding culture, 
that institutions, as he defines them, in-
fluence and constrain, but leave consid-
erable room for variability in the way so-
ciety actually organizes itself. Along 
these lines one can, as Williamson 
(1985), see the M form of organization of 
multi-product firms as, during the period 
from 1920 to 1970, a prevailing institu-
tion, defining the expectations and 
norms for such firms. IBM and GM were 
organizational exemplars of these norms, 
and as such often referred to as institu-
tions. However, according to this inter-
pretation the "institution" is really de-
fined by the pattern and the norms. 
Similarly, during the 1960s and 1970s 
Harvard and the University of California 
were institutional exemplars of what was 
widely accepted research universities 
should be. In the same vein, the IMF, 
and GA TT. were particular organiza-
tions, but also representing institutions, 
in being the particular manifestation of a 
set of norms and beliefs. 
I confess uneasiness at the broad and 
roomy definition of institutions invoked 
by the old institutionalists, and my un-
easiness here carries over to the modern 
practice of calling any widespread prac-
tice, that can be interpreted as the equi-
librium of a game, an institution. But 
here I put these concerns aside and re-
flect on the proposition that, however 
they may be defined, the institutions we 
now have came about as a result of an 
evolutionary process. 
Abstracting from the enormous diver-
sity of things that have been called insti-
tutions, there are several key matters 
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that I believe any serious theory of insti-
tutional evolution must address. One is 
path dependency. Today's "institutions" 
almost always show strong connections 
with yesterday's, and often those of a 
century ago, or earlier. 
A second is that it almost certainly is 
necessary to think of evolutionary "pro-
cesses" in the plural. Different kinds of 
institutions evolve in different ways. The 
earlier generation of institutional econo-
mists tended to stress the role of express 
collective decision making. The present 
generation tends to stress unplanned 
self-organization. In many cases the evo-
lutionary processes at work seem to in-
volve a blend of market, professional, 
and political processes, and it is likely an 
enormous task to sort these out and get 
an accurate assessment of operative "fit-
ness" criteria and selection mechanisms. 
One virtue of recognizing evolutionary 
theorizing as a class is that this encour-
ages the application of what is learned in 
analysis of one topic to analysis of others. 
The intellectual traverse taken by North 
is quite interesting in this regard. In his 
early work on economic institutions 
(Lance Davis and North 1971), North's 
position was that, despite the fact that 
interested parties often differed in their 
goals, and despite the fact that collective 
political processes often were involved 
centrally in the process of institutional 
evolution, evolution did assure some-
thing like optimality. On the other hand, 
in his recent writings (North 1990), he 
draws lessons from the above learning 
and distances himself sharply from any 
position along side Pangloss. His central 
argument is this. First, the major differ-
ences among nations in economic per-
formance largely are due to differences 
in their institutions and how they have 
evolved. While nowhere can they be re-
garded as optimal, in some countries 
they have evolved in a way that is favor-
able to economic progress and in other 
countries not. Second, the advanced in-
dustrial nations have been extremely for-
tunate in this regard; one cannot attrib-
ute their relative well being to any 
special virtue and wisdom but rather to 
cultural and political contingencies. 
Friedrich Hayek (1988) long has 
stressed the evolutionary character of 
the way modern economic institutions 
have developed, using the following ar-
gument. The structure of prevailing in-
stitutions is far too complex for human 
beings to comprehend, hence there is no 
way people could actually have designed 
them. More, to think that we could, or 
that we can scrap them and replace them 
with something we can plan that would 
be better, is a "Fatal Conceit." Hayek is 
far too sophisticated a scholar to be 
tarred as arguing that existing institu-
tions are optimal. Nor, while conserva-
tives appropriately place him in their 
Pantheon, does he deny that conscious 
public action has played an important 
role in structuring the institutions we 
presently have. Rather, his central point 
is that our present institutional struc-
tures must be interpreted as largely the 
result of a process involving somewhat 
blind variation and social selection. 
However, for reasons he is unable or 
unwilling to state, Hayek does not lay 
out exactly "How the West Grew Rich," 
to borrow a term from Rosenberg and 
Luther Birdzell (1986). There is little 
discussion in Hayek about the actual 
mechanisms that have "selected" the in-
stitutions we now have, only some asser-
tions that what we have is the result of 
social learning. He says virtually nothing 
about how that occurs, or how it works in 
the benefit of the society as a whole, as 
contrasted with favoring individual inter-
ests that, when they are aggregated, are 
destructive of everyone. Yet somehow 
(he implicitly argues) what we have 
achieved works pretty well (this is 
North's point), and in any case messing 
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with it in any radical way almost surely 
will make things worse. 
Rosenberg and Birdzell argue a variant 
of this theme. It is that "the West Grew 
Rich" because the societies broke loose 
from the norms and constraints of old in-
stitutions, and kept political process 
from doing too much, and let the "mar-
ket" work. 
But this will not quite do as a coherent 
theory. The "market" here is not just the 
market for goods and services or new 
techniques of production or modes of or-
ganizing private production. Rosenberg 
and Birdzell also are concerned with the 
institutions of modem science, bodies of 
law and mechanisms to enforce law and 
make new law, etc. It probably is use-
ful to posit that these "institutions" 
"evolved." One can even speak of a "mar-
ket" for institutional changes. We saw 
this earlier in the discussion of theories 
that proposed the law evolved to en-
hance economic efficiency. But in fact 
there is no real "market" that sorts out 
among proposed changes in the law. 
Rather there is a set of economic and po-
litical interests, professional and lay be-
liefs about what the law should be, and a 
diverse set of mechanisms, some ex-
pressly political and some not, through 
which these interests . and norms influ-
ence the evolution of the law. And the 
same is true for most other things that 
we lump under the term "economic insti-
tutions." We have very little under-
standing of how this kind of a selection 
environment works, and how it defines 
"fitness." (For a similar view see Mary 
Douglas 1986.) We have no reason to be-
lieve that such selection environments 
are stringent, or stable, much less that 
they select on "economic efficiency." 
And yet, it is arguably the case that the 
now advanced industrial nations have 
achieved dramatic economic progress (in 
most if not all dimensions) over the last 
century and a half. As argued in an ear-
lier section, development of new tech-
nology certainly has been the primary 
force, but institutional structures have 
evolved to enable new technologies to 
operate relatively effectively. Indeed, 
the broad form of the modern corpora-
tion with R & D laboratory, and the 
modern university, which have become 
the major sources of technological ad-
vance, themselves have coevolved with 
technology. 
It is clear that, somehow, in the now 
advanced industrial nations, there have 
been mechanisms that have made the 
coevolution of technology, industrial 
organization, and institutions more 
broadly, move in directions that have led 
to sustained economic progress. Private 
actions leading to "self organization" 
have been part of the story, but collec-
tive action has been as well. It is absurd 
to argue that processes of institutional 
evolution "optimize"; the very notion of 
optimization may be incoherent in a set-
ting where the range of possibilities is 
not well defined, even if the issue of dif-
ferent interests could be resolved in this 
terminology (as through the set concept 
of Pareto optimality). However, there 
seem to be forces that stop or turn 
around particular directions of institu-
tional evolution that, pursued at great 
length, would be disastrous. And strong 
shifts in the needs of large and powerful 
groups tend to be followed by shifts in 
the direction of institutional evolution 
toward ones that better reflect their 
changed needs. I can conjecture plausi-
ble models that yield these results. How-
ever, to date they have not been ex-
plored analytically with any rigor. 
Undoubtedly part of the problem re-
flects the still primitive state of our abil-
ity to work with cultural evolutionary 
theories. In this particular case I am sure 
it also stems from an overly broad and 
vague concept of the variable in ques-
tion-institutions-which is defined so 
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as to cover an extraordinarily diverse set 
of things. Before we make more head-
way in understanding how "institutions" 
evolve we may have to unpack and dras-
tically disaggregate the concept. But our 
difficulty also may signal the limits of the 
power of economics or social science 
theory more generally to comprehend a 
set of processes as complex as those be-
hind economic growth as we have known 
it . 
VIII . Reprise 
This essay has aimed to provide an 
overview of recent writings by econo-
mists , and some other social scientists, 
who have put forth express theoretical 
arguments that the variables the authors 
are examining change through evolution-
ary processes. I have concentrated on 
works where empirical subject matter is 
the focus of attention, and an evolution-
ary theory is invoked to explain the ob-
served or alleged pattern of change, and 
largely have neglected works where the 
formal aspects of an evolutionary theory 
are central and empirical subject matter 
brought in mostly as stylized examples. 
However a unifying characteristic of the 
writings surveyed here is that the evolu-
tionary theorizing is set out explicitly, as 
contrasted with coming in mostly as a 
way of talking about the empirical sub-
ject matter. 
As I argued in the introduction, the 
latter long has been common in econom-
ics. It is the express evolutionary theoriz-
ing that is relatively new. 
The theoretical arguments I have sur-
veyed range from quite precise and for-
mal, to storytelling. Virtually all of the 
them, however, are put forth by their 
authors to provide a different, and in the 
author's view a better, theory than one 
which uses the conventional assumptions 
of "equilibrium" theorizing. 
This of course raises the question of 
what one might mean by "better." More 
accurate prediction? "On the button" 
prediction never has been a hallmark of 
economic analysis, and it is unlikely that 
predictions motivated by an evolutionary 
theoretic framework are systematically 
better or worse than those motivated by 
a neoclassical theory. The heart of quan-
titative prediction making in economics 
lies in the details of the prediction equa-
tions, and these almost always reflect 
judgment of the particular context as 
much as formal theory. 
Better explanation? If by "better" one 
means statistical "better fits" in various 
senses, again the heart of the exercise is 
in the details of the equations that are 
fitted, and those details are as much a 
matter of art as of broad formal theory. 
Indeed formal general theory usually 
provides only loose constraints on mod-
els designed to fit particular bodies of 
data. 
On the other hand if by "better expla-
nation" one means one that is consistent 
with informed judgments as to what re-
ally is going on, that is exactly the case 
for evolutionary theory put forth by 
those that advocate it. In general those 
informed judgments reflect inferences 
drawn from a broad and diversified body 
of data. Thus evolutionary theories of 
productivity growth at a macroeconomic 
level feel right to their advocates not 
simply because they can be tuned to fit 
those particular data pretty well, but also 
because the evolutionary explanation is 
consistent with observed differences in 
productivity and profit among firms, 
with the fact that even obviously supe-
rior new technology usually diffuses 
slowly, and like observations, that it 
takes more strain for neoclassical theory 
to encompass. 
And that, I would argue, is an impor-
tant part of what the "bettemess" crite-
rion ought to be. Does the explanation 
ring right to those who know the details 
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of the field? It would seem that this is 
the issue Marshall had in mind when he 
wrote the sentences that began the es-
say. Mechanical theories did not ring 
right with him. 
But he also raised the issue of com-
plexity. If there is value in formal theo-
rizing in economics it lies in the ability 
to work through complex causal argu-
ments , but if.the complexity is too great 
one either may lose ability to understand 
what the theory is doing-what leads to 
what conclusions-or to check the logic 
for accuracy, or both. For all the reasons 
discussed in the introduction, econo-
mists now are far better able to deal with 
analytic complexity in general, and the 
complexity of evolutionary models in 
particular, than we were twenty years 
ago, much less in Marshall's time. There 
is no doubt, however, that evolutionary 
theories still tend to be complex. 
Thus those who are attracted to devel-
oping and employing them to address 
the phenomena in which they are inter-
ested are making an intellectual bet that 
the price of added complexity is worth 
paying to buy the better ability to devise 
and work with a theory that rings right. 
The bet is that evolutionary theory opens 
up a productive research program, to use 
Lakatos' idea, that is foreclosed or more 
difficult if one stays with mechanical 
analogies . 
The use of formal evolutionary theory 
in economics is still new, and the propo-
nents of evolutionary theory are strug-
gling with both techniques and stan-
dards . It is clear that a number of the 
evolutionary theories put forth by econo-
mists in recent years are difficult to fol-
low in terms of their cause~ff ect logic, 
and some may be logically incoherent. 
Merely adopting evolutionary theoretic 
language does not automatically lead to a 
logical model. But a number of the new 
evolutionary theories do seem coherent, 
and analytically powerful. The coherence 
and power of evolutionary theorizing ob-
viously depends on the skill and dili-
gence of the theorist. There would ap-
pear to be nothing different here 
between neoclassical and evolutionary 
theorizing. 
This said, it is clear that one of the 
appeals of evolutionary theorizing about 
economic change is that that mode of 
theorizing does seem better to corre-
spond to the actual complexity of the 
processes, as these are described by the 
scholars who have studied them in detail. 
There is no question that, in taking 
aboard this complexity, one often ends 
up with a theory in which precise predic-
tions are impossible or highly dependent 
on particular contingencies, as is the 
case if the theory implies multiple or 
rapidly shifting equilibria, or if under the 
theory the system is likely to be far away 
from any equilibrium, except under very 
special circumstances. Thus an evolu-
tionary theory not only may be more 
complex than an equilibrium theory. It 
may be less decisive in its predictions 
and explanations. To such a complaint, 
the advocate of an evolutionary theory 
might reply that the apparent power of 
the simpler theory in fact is an illusion. 
A good case can be made that the top-
ics and sectors where evolutionary theo-
ries that have been developed to date are 
notably weak regarding prediction, and 
somewhat ad hoc on explanation, are 
those where standard neoclassical theo-
ries have great difficulties also. They are 
areas where there is no real market, or 
where market selection is strongly mixed 
with political or professional influences. 
The problem in theorizing here clearly 
lies not in the evolutionary art form, but 
in the complexity of the subject matter. 
Many years ago Veblen (1896) asked, 
"Why Is Economics Not an Evolutionary 
Science?" In my view economics would 
be a stronger field if its theoretical 
framework were expressly evolutionary. 
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Such a framework would help us see and 
understand better the complexity of the 
economic reality. That, I think, is its 
greatest advantage . But it will not make 
the complexity go away. 
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